Martin v. Richey
1999 Ind. LEXIS 418, 711 N.E.2d 1273, 1999 WL 463484 (1999)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An occurrence-based medical malpractice statute of limitations is unconstitutional as applied under the Indiana Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause (Art. I, § 23) and Open Courts Clause (Art. I, § 12) when it deprives a plaintiff, who could not reasonably discover their injury and malpractice within the statutory period due to the nature of their medical condition, of a meaningful opportunity to file a valid tort claim.
Facts:
- On March 13, 1991, Melody Martin visited Dr. Robert Richey's office complaining of a painful lump in her right breast, which a nurse practitioner examined and arranged for a mammogram.
- The mammogram on the same day revealed a solid echogenic mass in Martin's right breast, and the radiologist's report recommended a biopsy based on her history of the lump's enlargement.
- On March 18, 1991, Dr. Richey returned to his office, was informed of Martin's condition and the scheduled excisional biopsy, but did not consult the radiologist; instead, he called Martin and told her to cancel her scheduled excisional biopsy, advising he would perform a needle aspiration in his office.
- On March 20, 1991, Dr. Richey performed the needle aspiration, which extracted a small amount of fluid and returned a pathology report with no malignant tumor cells; according to Martin, Dr. Richey assured her the mass was probably fibrocystic breast disease and did not inform her of the need for further follow-up or an excisional biopsy.
- Martin did not seek further medical consultation for the breast lump from Dr. Richey or any other health care provider until April 1994, over three years later.
- In April 1994, Martin experienced increased pain from the lump and under her right arm, leading to a mammogram and core biopsy that diagnosed adenocarcinoma (breast cancer) with extensive lymph node involvement.
- On April 15, 1994, Dr. Topolgus performed a right modified radical mastectomy on Martin, followed by a course of chemotherapy.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 14, 1994, Melody Martin filed a complaint against Dr. Robert Richey for damages with the Indiana Department of Insurance, alleging negligent failure to diagnose and treat her breast cancer, and requested review by a Medical Review Panel.
- On May 19, 1995, Dr. Richey filed a Motion for Preliminary Determination of a Question of Law and Motion to Dismiss with the trial court, arguing Martin's complaint was time-barred by the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations.
- Martin opposed Dr. Richey's motion, asserting the equitable doctrines of active or constructive fraudulent concealment and that the statute was unconstitutional.
- The trial court found Dr. Richey’s conduct did not amount to active fraudulent concealment, declined to hold the statute unconstitutional, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Richey.
- Martin appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals (Martin as appellant, Dr. Richey as appellee).
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding there were genuine issues of material fact regarding fraudulent concealment and that the statute of limitations violated Article I, Section 23 and Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution (Martin as appellant, Dr. Richey as appellee).
- Dr. Richey petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court for transfer (Dr. Richey as petitioner/appellant, Martin as respondent/appellee).
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the application of Indiana's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations violate Article I, Section 23 (Privileges and Immunities Clause) and Article I, Section 12 (Open Courts Clause) of the Indiana Constitution, as applied to a patient whose medical condition (breast cancer with a long latency period) prevented her from discovering the alleged malpractice within the statutory period?
Opinions:
Majority - Selby, J.
Yes, the application of Indiana's two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations to Melody Martin violates Article I, Section 23 and Section 12 of the Indiana Constitution. The court clarifies that while the statute is facially constitutional, its application to Martin is unconstitutional because her breast cancer, a medical condition with a long latency period, prevented her from discovering the alleged malpractice within the statutory two-year period. Under Article I, Section 23 (Privileges and Immunities Clause), the statute is not "uniformly applicable" to all medical malpractice victims because it unfairly precludes those with long-latency diseases from pursuing a claim as they cannot discover their injury within the statutory period, effectively closing access to the courts. Under Article I, Section 12 (Open Courts Clause), applying the statute in this manner imposes an "impossible condition" on a plaintiff's access to courts and pursuit of a tort remedy, as it would require her to file a claim before she could reasonably know of her injury and damages, which are essential elements of any negligence claim. The court emphasizes that this ruling ensures justice without striking down the statute on its face, giving deference to legislative discretion, but ensuring that access to courts for a valid claim is not arbitrarily denied.
Concurring - Sullivan, J.
I concur in the result, which is to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment, but I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations violates Article I, Section 12 or Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution. Precedent, including cases like Havens v. Ritchey and Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., firmly establishes the constitutionality of this statute, and subsequent case law has implicitly rejected the application of City of Fort Wayne v. Cameron to constitutionalize a discovery rule for medical malpractice. Instead, I believe summary judgment for the defendant was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the doctrine of active fraudulent concealment, a non-constitutional ground for resolution which is generally preferred.
Dissenting - Shepard, C.J.
No, the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. I join Justice Sullivan in adhering to the precedent set in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc., which upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The majority's holding that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs who cannot promptly discover their injury seems to effectively amount to a facial unconstitutionality. This contradicts the established purpose of the statute, which is to implement an event-based rather than a discovery-based limitation period, a question already resolved by this Court.
Analysis:
This case significantly limits the practical effect of Indiana's 'occurrence-based' medical malpractice statute of limitations. By holding the statute unconstitutional as applied in situations where discovery of injury is impossible within the statutory period due to long-latency conditions, the Indiana Supreme Court effectively introduces a discovery-rule exception without overturning the statute's facial constitutionality. This creates a critical safeguard for patients with conditions like cancer that may not manifest symptoms or be diagnosed within two years, ensuring their access to justice. Future cases will likely involve nuanced arguments about what constitutes 'reasonable diligence' in discovery and the 'nature of the asserted malpractice and resulting injury' to determine when this 'as-applied' unconstitutionality doctrine should be invoked.
