Martin v. Parrish
35 Educ. L. Rep. 1011, 805 F.2d 583 (1986)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A public college instructor's use of profanity in the classroom is not protected by the First Amendment when the speech does not address a matter of public concern and is not germane to the course's subject matter.
Facts:
- Martin was an economics instructor at Midland College, a public institution.
- In 1983, following a student complaint about his frequent use of words like 'hell,' 'damn,' and 'bullshit' in class, college administrators formally warned Martin.
- Martin was notified orally and in writing that continued use of profanity could lead to his suspension or termination.
- Heedless of the warning, Martin continued to use profane language in his classroom.
- On June 19, 1984, Martin directed a profane outburst at his class, stating 'the attitude of the class sucks,' '[the attitude] is a bunch of bullshit,' and 'if you don’t like the way I teach this God damn course there is the door.'
- Two students filed written complaints about this incident.
- Following these complaints, the college dean initiated termination proceedings, which were ultimately approved by the college’s board of trustees.
Procedural Posture:
- Martin filed a § 1983 lawsuit in federal district court against the president, vice president, dean, and trustees of Midland College.
- The lawsuit alleged deprivation of his First Amendment right of free speech, academic freedom, due process, and equal protection.
- A jury in the trial court found in Martin's favor on his free speech and equal protection claims and awarded damages, but denied his due process claim.
- The district court judge granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) in favor of the college officials, reversing the jury's verdict.
- Martin, as the appellant, appealed the district court's JNOV to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with the college officials as appellees.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the First Amendment's protection of free speech prevent a public college from terminating an instructor for the inveterate use of profanity in the classroom when that language does not relate to a matter of public concern?
Opinions:
Majority - Judge Edith Hollan Jones
No, the First Amendment does not prevent the college from terminating the instructor. For a public employee's speech to be constitutionally protected, it must first address a matter of 'public concern.' Here, Martin's profanity was not part of any public discourse; rather, it was used to express frustration and to castigate his students. Applying the test from Connick v. Myers, the court found that Martin's epithets did not address a matter of public concern, so it was unnecessary to scrutinize the college's reasons for his discharge. The court further reasoned, citing Bethel v. Fraser and FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, that educational institutions have an appropriate function to prohibit vulgar and offensive terms and that Martin's students constituted a 'captive audience' who should not be subjected to a 'deliberate, superfluous attack' with no academic purpose.
Concurring - Judge Robert Madden Hill
No, Martin's speech was not protected, but the analysis should be narrower. This case is resolved solely by applying Connick v. Myers. Martin's comments, taken as a whole, were a matter of personal frustration, not public concern, and thus unprotected. The majority's reliance on cases like Bethel and Pacifica, which involve high school students and minors, is unnecessary and inappropriate dicta. There are significant differences between a high school and a university environment, as college students are mature adults in a voluntary setting designed for challenging ideas. Applying standards meant to protect minors to a university setting is an over-broad and potentially incorrect extension of legal precedent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the application of the Connick v. Myers 'public concern' test to the in-class speech of public university professors. It establishes a precedent that a professor's pedagogical speech, when not connected to broader public issues, can be regulated by the employer, especially when it is deemed unprofessional. The majority's controversial extension of jurisprudence from the K-12 context (Bethel) and broadcast media (Pacifica) to higher education suggests a judicial willingness to view college students as a 'captive audience' deserving of protection from offensive speech, a position heavily contested by the concurrence. This creates a tension in First Amendment doctrine regarding the scope of academic freedom and the distinct nature of the university environment compared to secondary schools.
