Marshall v. Ranne
511 S.W.2d 255 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
An owner of a domestic animal that the owner knows or should know has vicious propensities is strictly liable for the harm it causes. In such a strict liability action, the plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence is not a defense, and the plaintiff does not voluntarily assume the risk if the defendant's tortious conduct leaves them with no reasonable alternative other than surrendering a legal right.
Facts:
- John C. Ranne and Paul Marshall owned neighboring farms.
- Ranne's boar hog escaped and was on Marshall's property for several weeks.
- The boar was vicious, having previously charged Marshall ten to twelve times, trapped him in an outhouse, and attacked his wife on four or five occasions.
- Marshall had discussed the hog's viciousness with Ranne on several prior occasions.
- On the day of the injury, Marshall wrote a note to Ranne warning that the boar had 'gone bad' and needed to be removed before it hurt someone.
- Later that day, Marshall emerged from his house to walk to his pickup truck, which was on his property.
- After looking for the boar and not seeing it, Marshall started toward his truck.
- The boar charged Marshall from behind, grabbed his outstretched hand, and severely bit it.
Procedural Posture:
- Paul Marshall sued John C. Ranne in a Texas trial court to recover damages for his injuries.
- A jury found that Marshall was contributorily negligent and had voluntarily assumed the risk of the hog.
- The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the defendant, Ranne, based on the jury's verdict.
- Marshall, as appellant, appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.
- The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, reasoning that the jury's finding of assumption of risk was sufficient to support the judgment.
- Marshall then sought review from the Supreme Court of Texas.
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Issue:
Is a plaintiff's contributory negligence a defense to a strict liability action for injuries caused by a domestic animal known to be vicious, and does a plaintiff voluntarily assume the risk by confronting the animal on their own property when the only alternative is to surrender their right to use that property?
Opinions:
Majority - Pope, Justice.
No. A plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a defense to a strict liability action for injuries caused by a known vicious animal, and a plaintiff does not voluntarily assume the risk when the defendant's tortious conduct leaves the plaintiff with no reasonable alternative to exercising or protecting a legal right. The court held that suits for damages caused by vicious animals are governed by principles of strict liability, not negligence. Because strict liability's policy is to place the full responsibility on the defendant for harboring a dangerous animal, the plaintiff's ordinary contributory negligence is not a valid defense. While voluntary assumption of risk can be a defense, the plaintiff's choice must be truly free and voluntary. Here, Marshall was presented with a 'choice of evils' wrongfully imposed by the defendant: either remain a prisoner in his own house or risk an attack while exercising his legal right to use his property to get to his car. This is not a voluntary choice under the law, as it would require him to surrender a legal right. The alternative of shooting the hog was also deemed unreasonable, as it could have exposed Marshall to criminal charges.
Analysis:
This case solidifies Texas law by formally adopting the strict liability standard for injuries caused by known vicious domestic animals, resolving prior inconsistencies in lower court rulings. By rejecting contributory negligence as a defense, the decision aligns Texas with the modern trend and the Restatement of Torts, emphasizing that the entire responsibility rests with the person harboring the dangerous animal. Furthermore, the court's analysis of assumption of risk provides a significant precedent, clarifying that a choice made under duress, where a person must either face a danger or forfeit a legal right (like the use of one's own property), is not 'voluntary.' This reasoning extends beyond animal cases and can influence the application of the assumption of risk defense in other areas of tort law.
