No. Just putting the policy in the wife's name doesn't make it all hers. The law in California is that property bought during a marriage with shared money is shared property. To change 'shared' property into one person's 'separate' property, there's a very strict rule: the spouse giving up their share must sign a document that clearly says so. The court said this rule applies even when you buy something from an outsider, like an insurance company. Because Frankie never signed a paper saying, 'I give up my half of this policy,' it remains shared property to be split in the divorce.

No, and the lower court was wrong for even considering a different rule. This judge agreed with the final decision but wanted to make an extra point. He said there's a general legal idea that whoever's name is on the title is the owner. But in a divorce, the special rules for marriage and shared property are much more important and should be the only ones used. The main rule is that stuff bought during a marriage is shared, and that rule should always come first in a divorce case.

No, the policy doesn't belong just to Randy even though it's in her name. When married people buy something with money they earned together, it usually belongs to both of them equally. To change this, they need to agree in writing that they want to make it belong to just one of them. Frankie and Randy didn't do this. Just putting Randy's name on the policy isn't enough to make it hers alone. So, the policy still belongs to both of them equally.

I agree with what Justice Kennard said. I also want to add that when married people are dividing their stuff in a divorce, we shouldn't use the rule that says things belong to whoever's name they're in. That rule is for other situations, not for divorces. In divorces, we should use the special rules about married people's property. These rules say that things bought during the marriage usually belong to both people equally, no matter whose name they're in.

No. The use of community funds to purchase an asset from a third party and title it in one spouse's name alone does not transmute the asset into separate property unless the statutory requirements for transmutation, including a written express declaration, are met. The court rejected the argument that the transmutation statutes apply only to direct interspousal transactions and not to acquisitions from third parties. The legislative purpose of Family Code § 852 was to prevent litigation based on unreliable evidence by requiring a clear, written statement for a property's character to change. Creating an exemption for third-party purchases would undermine this purpose and lead to arbitrary results. If the purchase is characterized as a gift from one spouse to another, it is an interspousal transaction subject to the statute. Furthermore, the general form of title presumption found in Evidence Code § 662 cannot override the specific transmutation requirements of the Family Code in marital dissolution proceedings. As Frankie Valli never made an express written declaration giving up his community interest in the funds used to buy the policy, the policy remains community property.

No. The court's conclusion is correct, but it should be emphasized that the common law form of title presumption in Evidence Code § 662 has no role in characterizing property between spouses in a dissolution proceeding. The community property presumption under Family Code § 760 is a fundamental tenet of California law and is part of a self-contained statutory scheme. The purpose of Evidence Code § 662 is to promote the stability of titles for the protection of third parties and creditors, a policy concern that is largely irrelevant in a dispute between spouses over marital property. Applying § 662 would subvert the community property system by creating a conflicting presumption that any asset titled in one spouse's name is their separate property, thereby nullifying the core community property presumption.

No. The life insurance policy remains community property because the statutory transmutation requirements were not met. The form of title presumption under Evidence Code section 662 does not apply in marital dissolution proceedings to characterize property acquired during the marriage. The community property presumption under Family Code section 760 controls unless rebutted by evidence that the property falls under a statutory exception. Here, there was no express written declaration changing the character of the property from community to separate as required for transmutation. Therefore, despite the policy being in the wife's name, it does not alter its nature as community property. The Court of Appeal's judgment is reversed.

I concur with the majority's decision and reasoning. I write separately to emphasize that Evidence Code section 662's form of title presumption has no place in characterizing property in actions between spouses. The detailed community property statutes in the Family Code, including the section 760 presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property, are self-contained and not affected by Evidence Code section 662. Applying section 662 to disputes between spouses would subvert basic tenets of California family law and largely nullify the community property presumption, as much property acquired during marriage is often in the name of one spouse. The community property statutes in the Family Code are sufficient unto themselves in actions between spouses.

Marr. of Valli

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