Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., et al.
525 U.S. 33 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
A union does not breach its duty of fair representation merely by negotiating a union security clause that tracks the language of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act without including judicial interpretations of that language in the agreement. Claims that purely allege a statutory violation of the NLRA, without accompanying facts showing arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith conduct, fall within the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
Facts:
- Screen Actors Guild (SAG), a union, and Lakeside Productions, a production company, entered into a collective bargaining agreement.
- The agreement contained a union security clause requiring performers to be a 'member of the Union in good standing,' which tracked the language of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
- Petitioner Marquez, a part-time actress, was hired by Lakeside for a one-line role in a television series.
- Because Marquez had worked in the industry for more than 30 days previously, the union security clause required her to pay union fees before she could work on the production.
- A casting director told Marquez she had to pay SAG before she could work, and she learned the fees would be around $500.
- Marquez attempted to negotiate a delayed payment plan with SAG but was unsuccessful.
- When Marquez failed to pay the fees by the production deadline, Lakeside hired a different actress for the part.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner Marquez filed suit against Screen Actors Guild (SAG) and Lakeside Productions in the United States District Court.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims.
- Marquez, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s judgment that SAG did not breach its duty of fair representation by negotiating the clause and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the grace period claim.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review these two holdings.
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Issue:
Does a union breach its duty of fair representation by negotiating a union security clause that uses the language of § 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act without explicitly explaining in the agreement that 'membership' only requires paying fees related to collective bargaining activities? Separately, do federal courts have jurisdiction over a claim that a union security clause's grace period provision is inconsistent with the NLRA when the claim is framed as a breach of the duty of fair representation?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
No, a union does not breach its duty of fair representation merely by negotiating a union security clause that tracks statutory language, and no, federal courts do not have jurisdiction over a claim that is purely a statutory violation disguised as a DFR claim. A union breaches its duty of fair representation only when its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Negotiating a clause that uses the language of the NLRA is not arbitrary because the statutory language is a 'term of art' that incorporates all subsequent judicial interpretations, including those from NLRB v. General Motors Corp. and Communications Workers v. Beck. Such conduct is not in bad faith because the union is not obligated to explain every legal term of art in a contract; doing so would make contracts unwieldy, and a union may reasonably prefer to notify employees of their rights through other, more effective means. Regarding jurisdiction, a plaintiff cannot circumvent the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) simply by casting a statutory NLRA claim as a duty of fair representation violation. For a federal court to have jurisdiction, the claim must be supported by facts alleging arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct, not just a statutory inconsistency. Marquez's challenge to the grace-period provision is a pure statutory claim and thus belongs before the NLRB.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes, I agree with the Court's holding. The Court's conclusion is narrow: the mere negotiation of a security clause reciting statutory language does not, without more, violate the duty of fair representation. However, this does not mean such language can be used as a defense if there is additional evidence that the clause was used or intended to deceive or mislead employees. The wording of the clause could be highly relevant evidence in a claim, supported by other facts, that the union misinformed an employee or employer. The Court's opinion does not foreclose such a claim, nor does it address whether using such language might constitute an unfair labor practice, which is a separate issue for the NLRB.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the high bar for proving a breach of the duty of fair representation, reaffirming that a union's conduct must be 'wholly irrational' to be considered arbitrary. It provides unions with a safe harbor, allowing them to use statutory language in collective bargaining agreements without being required to append detailed explanations of judicial gloss. The ruling also reinforces the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, channeling pure statutory interpretation disputes under the NLRA to the specialized expertise of the National Labor Relations Board and preventing federal courts from being flooded with disguised unfair labor practice claims.
