Marquette v. Marquette
22 O.S.Supp. 1983 § 60 et seq. (1984)
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Rule of Law:
Proceedings under the Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are civil, not criminal, in nature, and therefore require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt. The Act's provisions allowing for temporary ex parte protective orders do not violate procedural due process because the state's compelling interest in protecting victims from immediate harm outweighs the temporary infringement on the defendant's rights, provided a prompt post-deprivation hearing is available.
Facts:
- Jeff L. Marquette and Julie M. Marquette were divorced on September 10, 1982.
- Julie Marquette was awarded custody of the couple's two young sons.
- Following the divorce, Julie alleged Jeff engaged in continued harassment and assault against her.
- Specifically, Julie claimed that Jeff threw the children's clothes, shoes, toys, and even the children themselves at her.
- Julie also stated that Jeff made verbal threats to her in front of the children.
- As a result of these actions, Julie feared she would be harmed, as she had been in the past, and was concerned about the emotional damage to her children.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 13, 1982, Julie M. Marquette filed a petition for a protective order against Jeff L. Marquette in the district trial court.
- The trial court issued an emergency ex parte protective order on the same day and scheduled a show cause hearing.
- Jeff L. Marquette filed a demurrer and a motion to dismiss the petition.
- After the hearing was continued, the trial court held a full hearing on November 19, 1982.
- Following the full hearing, the trial court entered a final mutual protective order.
- Jeff L. Marquette (Appellant) appealed the trial court's orders to the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, with Julie M. Marquette as the Appellee.
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Issue:
Is Oklahoma's Protection from Domestic Abuse Act, which authorizes ex parte protective orders and uses a civil standard of proof, unconstitutional because its placement in the criminal procedure code makes it criminal in nature and its temporary orders violate procedural due process?
Opinions:
Majority - Reynolds, J.
No, the Oklahoma Protection from Domestic Abuse Act is not unconstitutional. The Act establishes a civil proceeding, not a criminal one, and its ex parte order provisions satisfy the requirements of procedural due process. The court reasoned that the action is civil because it is initiated by a private party (the victim), not prosecuted by the state to punish a public offense. The Act's codification in the criminal procedure title and its title are not determinative of its substantive nature. Therefore, the appropriate standard of proof is the 'preponderance of the evidence.' Regarding due process, the court applied a balancing test, finding that the state's significant interest in providing immediate protection to victims of domestic violence outweighs the temporary interference with the defendant's parental visitation rights, especially since the Act provides for a prompt post-deprivation hearing where the defendant can be heard. The procedural safeguards, including a judge's finding of good cause for an emergency order, are sufficient to protect against erroneous deprivation.
Analysis:
This case is significant for establishing that domestic violence protective order proceedings are civil actions, thereby lowering the burden of proof for victims seeking protection compared to a criminal trial. It validates the use of ex parte temporary orders as a crucial tool for immediate intervention in domestic abuse situations. By applying the Mathews v. Eldridge due process balancing test, the court affirmed that the state's compelling interest in protecting citizens from harm can justify a temporary deprivation of rights, so long as procedural safeguards like a prompt hearing are in place. This decision provides a foundational legal justification for the structure of modern domestic violence statutes across the country.
