Mark Shaffer v. George Washington University
Not provided in text (2022)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under District of Columbia law, a university's relationship with its students can include implied-in-fact contracts for in-person education and specific on-campus services, inferred from communications, differential tuition pricing, and historical practices. Students may plausibly pursue breach of such contracts and alternative unjust enrichment claims, particularly when universities shift from in-person to online instruction without prorated refunds.
Facts:
- George Washington University (GW) and American University (American) offered various on-campus and online degree programs in Washington, D.C.
- GW historically charged significantly higher tuition rates for its on-campus programs compared to its online counterparts, and American's online learning programs were listed separately with distinct policies and cost information.
- Students (Plaintiffs) paid tuition and various fees for enrollment in on-campus instruction and experiences for the spring 2020 semester.
- On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic, leading to widespread travel and assembly restrictions in the United States.
- In mid-March 2020, both GW and American University transitioned all on-campus classes to online learning and largely suspended campus events and activities for the remainder of the spring 2020 semester.
- Neither university offered prorated refunds for the spring 2020 tuition or the various student fees following the transition to online learning and campus closures.
Procedural Posture:
- Shaffer Plaintiffs (GW students and parents) filed a consolidated class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion.
- The District Court granted GW's motion to dismiss the Shaffer Plaintiffs' claims, reasoning that no plausible reading of university materials created an enforceable contractual promise for in-person instruction, unjust enrichment was inappropriate, and conversion was insufficiently distinct.
- Qureshi Plaintiffs (American University students) filed a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and a violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act.
- The District Court granted American University's motion to dismiss the Qureshi Plaintiffs' claims, concluding the university only implied a good-faith effort for on-campus education, the fee claims failed, contract claims precluded unjust enrichment, conversion failed for lack of a specific fund, and CPPA failed due to lack of plausible misrepresentation.
- The Shaffer Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their breach-of-contract and unjust enrichment claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
- The Qureshi Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their breach-of-contract, unjust enrichment, conversion, and D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a university's shift to entirely online instruction and suspension of campus activities due to a pandemic plausibly constitute a breach of implied-in-fact contracts with students for in-person education and specific on-campus services, and can students simultaneously pursue alternative claims for unjust enrichment under District of Columbia law?
Opinions:
Majority - Senior Circuit Judge Edwards
Yes, the universities' shift to online learning due to the pandemic plausibly constitutes a breach of implied-in-fact contracts for in-person education and certain fees, and students can pursue unjust enrichment claims in the alternative. However, the court affirmed dismissal of express contract claims, some specific fee claims, and conversion claims. The court found that students failed to plausibly allege the existence of express contracts explicitly promising in-person instruction or on-campus services. However, students plausibly alleged implied-in-fact contracts for in-person education based on several factors: university communications highlighting the benefits of on-campus instruction, the universities' practice of charging significantly higher tuition for on-campus versus online programs, and the historical practice of providing on-campus instruction for traditional tuition rates. General reservation-of-rights clauses in university publications were deemed insufficient to, as a matter of law, allocate the entire financial risk of a pandemic-related shutdown to students. The court also held that students' claims for damages, which concerned the failure to deliver promised instruction rather than a subjective evaluation of educational quality, were cognizable. Regarding fees, the court reversed dismissal for GW's 'additional course fees' (e.g., lab fees tied to facilities) and American's 'sports center fee' (for access to facilities), finding plausible implied contracts. However, it affirmed dismissal for GW's 'student association fee,' and American's 'activity fee,' 'technology fee,' and 'Metro U-Pass fee,' as these were not plausibly tied to in-person services denied or were otherwise available. The court reversed the dismissal of unjust enrichment claims, allowing them to proceed as alternative theories of recovery. It reasoned that unjust enrichment claims are viable when a contract may be invalid, ineffective, or does not fully cover the disputed issue, as might occur if the universities' duty to perform was discharged due to impracticability. The court affirmed dismissal of the conversion claim due to the lack of a plausible allegation of a possessory interest in a specific, identifiable fund of money. Finally, the court reversed the dismissal of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act claim, remanding for reconsideration because the lower court's dismissal was based on a mistaken conclusion about the absence of plausible implied-in-fact agreements.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the contractual relationship between universities and their students under District of Columbia law, particularly concerning implied-in-fact promises for on-campus education and services. It establishes that such promises can be inferred from university communications, pricing structures, and historical practices, even without explicit contractual language. The decision reinforces the ability of plaintiffs to plead inconsistent alternative theories of recovery (breach of contract and unjust enrichment), allowing claims to proceed where contractual performance may have been excused but benefits were still conferred. This ruling provides a roadmap for students seeking tuition and fee refunds during unforeseen disruptions like pandemics and places a greater burden on universities to explicitly delineate the scope of their promises and risk allocation in their student agreements.
