Marion v. State
20 Neb. 233 (1886)
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Rule of Law:
Changes in trial procedure made after a crime is committed, such as shifting the determination of law from the jury to the judge, are not unconstitutional ex post facto laws so long as they do not alter the definition of the offense, increase the punishment, or remove substantial protections from the accused.
Facts:
- In 1872, Jackson Marion and John Cameron were seen together in Kansas.
- Marion wished to purchase a team, harness, and wagon from Cameron for $315, paying only $30 in cash.
- Marion and Cameron left Kansas together for Nebraska, with the understanding that Cameron would retain possession of the property until it was fully paid for.
- A few days later, Marion returned to the home of his wife's parents in Gage County, Nebraska, alone but in possession of Cameron's team and wagon and wearing some of Cameron's clothing.
- Marion stated that Cameron had gone to Clay County, Kansas.
- Following Cameron's disappearance, Marion also disappeared for approximately ten years.
- Decayed human remains, believed to be Cameron's, were later discovered in Gage County, with evidence of a fatal wound to the skull, such as a bullet hole.
Procedural Posture:
- Jackson Marion was indicted in the district court for Gage county for a murder that occurred in 1872.
- Following a jury trial, Marion was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death.
- Marion, as plaintiff in error, appealed to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, which reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial.
- Upon re-trial in the district court, Marion was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
- Marion, as plaintiff in error, initiated a second proceeding in error before the Supreme Court of Nebraska to review the judgment of the second trial.
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Issue:
Does a change in a state's criminal procedure, which removes the jury's role as judges of the law and vests that power solely in the court, violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws when applied to a defendant whose alleged crime was committed before the procedural change?
Opinions:
Majority - Reese, J.
No. A change in criminal procedure does not violate the ex post facto clause if it does not disadvantage the defendant's substantial rights. The court reasoned that a defendant has no vested right in the specific mode of procedure in place at the time an offense was committed. The change in law, which made the judge the arbiter of law instead of the jury, was a change in 'the manner of procedure' only. It did not alter the degree of punishment, the character of the offense, or the rules of evidence required for a conviction. Quoting Judge Cooley's treatise on Constitutional Limitations, the court affirmed that legislatures have the authority to alter remedies and modes of procedure without unconstitutionally abridging the rights of the accused, provided they do not dispense with the 'substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime.'
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction between substantive law and procedural law in the context of the Ex Post Facto Clause. By classifying the shift in the jury's role from fact-and-law-finder to fact-finder-only as a procedural change, the court affirmed the legislature's power to reform the mechanics of the justice system. The ruling provides a clear precedent that procedural updates, even in criminal cases, are permissible retroactively as long as they do not make it easier to convict or impose a harsher punishment. This interpretation allows the legal system to evolve without being constrained by outdated procedures for every past offense still being prosecuted.
