Mario Chacon v. State
Unpublished (1998)
Rule of Law:
A conviction for burglary of a habitation can be sustained by evidence of recent and unexplained possession of stolen property, even if the element of entry is proven solely by circumstantial evidence, and a new trial based on newly discovered evidence is only warranted if the evidence is material and would probably bring about a different result.
Facts:
- On August 19, 1996, Barbara Oden returned home around 10:30 p.m. to find her house ransacked and numerous valuable personal items, totaling over $20,000, missing, including a distinctive sapphire and diamond ring.
- Investigating officers found no evidence of forced entry but noted a 'doggie door' in the back door through which Oden had previously entered when locked out, and through which a smaller person could fit.
- On the same day as the burglary, at 12:03 p.m., Oden's distinctive sapphire and diamond ring and a Hitachi V.C.R. were pawned at a Doc Holliday's Pawnshop located in the same neighborhood as Oden's house.
- The individual pawning the items presented a driver's license identifying himself as Mario Roberto Chacon and signed a 'pawn ticket' with this name.
- A handwriting identification expert testified that it was 'highly probable' that the signature on the pawn ticket was Mario Chacon's known signature.
- Oden later found a man's medium-sized 'T shirt' in her laundry that she thought might belong to the burglar, but also testified it could have been left by someone else.
Procedural Posture:
- Mario Chacon was convicted by a jury in the District Court of Travis County, 167th Judicial District, for the offense of burglary of a habitation.
- The trial court assessed Chacon's punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, at imprisonment for forty years.
- Chacon filed a motion for new trial, claiming newly-discovered evidence.
- The trial court denied Chacon's motion for new trial, ruling he had not met his burden.
- Mario Chacon (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Texas Court of Appeals, Third District, at Austin, challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of his motion for new trial.
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Issue:
Does the recent and unexplained possession of property stolen from a burglarized habitation, combined with circumstantial evidence of entry, constitute legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a conviction for burglary of a habitation, and did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a motion for new trial based on newly discovered, speculative evidence?
Opinions:
Majority - Carl E. F. Dally, Justice
Yes, the recent and unexplained possession of property stolen from a burglarized habitation, combined with circumstantial evidence of entry, constitutes legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a conviction for burglary of a habitation, and no, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for new trial based on newly discovered, speculative evidence. The Court applied the legal sufficiency standard from Jackson v. Virginia, asking whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. For factual sufficiency, the Court applied the Clewis v. State standard, reviewing all evidence impartially to determine if the verdict was so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. The Court affirmed the long-standing principle that recent and unexplained possession of items taken in a burglary is sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary, and that the element of entry may be established by inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. Given the burglary, the theft of Oden's specific items, the doggie door as a potential entry point, and Chacon's pawning of the stolen goods just hours later using his identification and signature, a rational jury could find all elements, including entry, were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the motion for new trial based on the T-shirt, the Court found that Chacon failed to meet the strict materiality requirement established in Moore v. State, which demands that the newly discovered evidence would probably bring about a different result in another trial. The evidence surrounding the T-shirt was speculative; Oden was uncertain if it belonged to the burglar or was even from the time of the burglary, and Chacon's claim that it didn't fit was undermined by testimony of his weight gain, rendering its impact on the verdict improbable. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial.
Analysis:
This case reaffirms the critical role of circumstantial evidence, particularly the unexplained possession of recently stolen property, in proving all elements of burglary, including entry, in Texas law. It underscores the high burden placed on appellants challenging the sufficiency of evidence to overturn a jury's verdict, requiring the verdict to be either irrational (legal sufficiency) or clearly wrong and unjust (factual sufficiency). Furthermore, the ruling emphasizes the stringent, four-part test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, highlighting that such evidence must be truly material and likely outcome-determinative, not merely speculative or tangential, thereby granting significant deference to the trial court's discretion in such matters.
