Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Commission
113 P.3d 1062, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 30, 36 Cal. 4th 1 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory scheme authorizing legislative appointment of members to an executive agency does not violate the California Constitution's separation of powers clause if it does not intrude upon a core function of the executive branch and does not permit the legislative appointing authority to retain undue control over the appointees' executive actions.
Facts:
- Marine Forests Society, a non-profit corporation, began depositing materials such as used tires, plastic jugs, and concrete blocks on the ocean floor off Newport Harbor as part of an experimental program to create artificial marine habitats.
- Marine Forests did not seek or obtain a permit from the California Coastal Commission for these activities.
- In June 1993, the staff of the Coastal Commission informed Marine Forests that it was required to apply for a permit to conduct its activities.
- In 1995, Marine Forests submitted an application for an "after-the-fact" permit for the materials it had already deposited.
- In April 1997, the Coastal Commission denied Marine Forests’ permit application.
- Following the denial, the Commission directed its staff to commence enforcement proceedings, and in 1999, the executive director issued a notice of intent to begin cease-and-desist order proceedings against Marine Forests.
Procedural Posture:
- The Executive Director of the California Coastal Commission issued a 'Notice of Intent to Commence Cease and Desist Order Proceedings' against Marine Forests Society.
- Marine Forests Society filed suit against the California Coastal Commission in superior court (trial court), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the enforcement proceedings.
- The trial court granted summary adjudication in favor of Marine Forests Society, concluding the Commission's structure violated the separation of powers and enjoining it from exercising its permit and enforcement powers.
- The California Coastal Commission (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the legislative power to appoint and remove a majority of the Commission's members at will was unconstitutional.
- The California Coastal Commission (petitioner) filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of California, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the California Coastal Act's current statutory scheme, which authorizes the Senate Rules Committee and the Speaker of the Assembly to appoint a majority of the California Coastal Commission's voting members for fixed four-year terms, violate the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C.J.
No. The current statutory scheme governing the composition of the Coastal Commission does not violate the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the California Constitution does not categorically preclude the Legislature from appointing executive officers. A statutory scheme for legislative appointment is unconstitutional only if it (1) intrudes upon a 'core zone' of the Governor's executive functions, or (2) allows the legislative appointing authority to retain undue control over the appointee's executive actions. Here, the Commission's land-use functions are not a core executive power of the Governor. Furthermore, the current law, which provides legislative appointees with fixed four-year terms and eliminates the Legislature's power of at-will removal, provides sufficient independence to prevent undue legislative control.
Concurring - Kennard, J.
The majority is correct that the interbranch appointment law at issue here is constitutional. This case is distinguishable from Obrien v. Jones, where such appointments invaded the judiciary's core authority over attorney discipline. Here, the Coastal Commission is an independent agency with hybrid quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and executive duties, and the appointments do not improperly invade the traditional authority of the Governor or any other constitutional executive officer.
Concurring - Baxter, J.
I agree that the current statutory scheme is constitutional, particularly given the Commission's unique history originating from a voter initiative that established the shared appointment structure. However, the prior statutory scheme, which allowed the legislative branch to remove its appointees at will, was constitutionally flawed. That at-will removal power created an improper subservience to the legislative branch by giving it 'moment-by-moment control' over a majority of the Commission's members, which violated the separation of powers.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
I agree with the majority's conclusion and write separately to emphasize the application of the de facto officer doctrine. This doctrine is appropriate here because the separation-of-powers challenge is a broad structural claim that, if successful, would invalidate all of the Commission's past executive and quasi-judicial acts. The holding should be read narrowly and not as a general rule preventing parties from directly challenging an agency's specific unconstitutional actions in other contexts.
Analysis:
This decision distinguishes California's separation of powers doctrine from its more rigid federal counterpart, confirming the Legislature's authority to appoint members of executive agencies. It establishes a two-part test focusing on intrusion into 'core' executive functions and the prevention of 'undue control,' effectively sanctioning legislative appointments so long as appointees are granted sufficient independence, such as fixed terms of office. The ruling validates the appointment structure of numerous California boards and commissions while strongly implying that legislative power to remove executive appointees 'at will' is unconstitutional, a view explicitly confirmed in a concurrence.
