Maria Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms, Inc.
87 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1314, 22 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1, 743 F.3d 1236 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
An employee can affirmatively decline to use leave provided under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), even if the underlying reason for seeking the leave would have invoked FMLA protection, and such a declination is not considered a waiver of FMLA rights.
Facts:
- Maria Escriba worked in a Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. processing plant in Turlock, California for 18 years.
- In November 2007, Escriba learned her father was seriously ill and hospitalized in Guatemala.
- Escriba's daughter purchased a round-trip plane ticket for Escriba to Guatemala, with a return date of December 27, 2007.
- On November 19, 2007, Escriba met with her immediate supervisor, Linda Mendoza, requesting "vacation" time and mentioning her father's illness.
- On November 21, 2007, Linda Mendoza, using Alfonso Flores as an interpreter, twice asked Escriba if she needed more than two weeks in Guatemala to care for her father, and Escriba twice responded "no."
- Linda Mendoza informed Escriba that if the two weeks of vacation were insufficient, she would need to visit the Human Resources Department.
- Escriba also spoke with Ed Mendoza, a facility superintendent who spoke Spanish, handed him her vacation slip, and asked for one or two more weeks of leave, to which he responded he could not grant it but advised her to send documentation to HR if she could not return by December 10, 2007.
- Escriba traveled to Guatemala and, shortly after arriving, decided that returning to work on December 10, 2007, would be impractical but failed to contact Foster Farms about extending her leave until December 21, 2007.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 26, 2009, Maria Escriba filed a lawsuit against Foster Poultry Farms, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and California public policy.
- Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court denied, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Escriba invoked or declined FMLA protections and the sufficiency of her notice.
- A six-day jury trial was held in July 2011, during which both parties moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).
- The district court denied Foster Farms's JMOL motion and reserved judgment on Escriba's motion.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Foster Farms.
- The district court subsequently denied Escriba's renewed motion for JMOL and her request for a new trial.
- Foster Farms, as the prevailing party, moved to tax costs against Escriba; however, the district court denied this motion.
- Both Escriba (as plaintiff-appellant) and Foster Farms (as defendant-appellee/cross-appellant) timely appealed the respective adverse rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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Issue:
Does an employee have the right to affirmatively decline to use Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave, even when the reason for their absence would otherwise qualify for FMLA protection?
Opinions:
Majority - Ronald Lee Gilman
Yes, an employee can affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave, even if the underlying reason for seeking leave would have invoked FMLA protection. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the FMLA and its regulations, particularly 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) and § 825.303(b), suggest that an employer should inquire whether FMLA leave is being sought, implying that an employee might seek time off without intending to exercise FMLA rights. Forcing FMLA leave on an unwilling employee could expose an employer to liability for an involuntary-leave claim (Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007)). The court clarified that affirmatively declining the present exercise of an FMLA right to preserve it for future use is fundamentally different from waiving that right, as prohibited by 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d). The court found substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that Escriba elected not to take FMLA leave, including her multiple "no" responses when asked if she needed more time, her past practice of contacting Human Resources for FMLA leave but approaching her supervisor for vacation, and the company's policy that allowed employees to preserve FMLA time by taking vacation first. The court also held that admitting evidence of Escriba’s prior FMLA usage was not an error of law because it was relevant to her intent and knowledge of company policies, and any potential prejudice was mitigated by the district court’s limiting jury instructions.
Analysis:
This case clarifies an important aspect of FMLA administration, establishing that employees have the agency to decline FMLA leave, even when eligible, and that such a declination is not a prohibited waiver of rights. This decision creates a fine line for employers: while they have an obligation to inquire if leave is FMLA-qualifying, they must also respect an employee's explicit choice not to designate their leave as FMLA. This may encourage employees to strategically manage their FMLA allotment, potentially using paid time off first to preserve FMLA for longer or future needs, but it also places the burden on employees to be clear about their intentions to avoid termination under standard attendance policies.
