Marguerite Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop
1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 5404, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 247 F.2d 23 (1957)
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Rule of Law:
A manufacturer is not liable for negligence for failing to warn of a danger that is obvious and universally known, which is inherent in the use of a simple, non-defective product.
Facts:
- Marguerite Jamieson saw a magazine advertisement for an elastic exerciser named “Lithe-Line,” manufactured by Helena Rubinstein, Inc.
- She purchased the “Lithe-Line” by its trade name from a Woodward & Lothrop department store.
- The product was a simple, non-defective rubber rope, about forty inches long with loops on the ends, and was accompanied by printed instructions showing various exercises.
- Jamieson began performing the “Tummy Flattener” exercise as depicted in the instructions, which required her to lie on her back and place the rope under her feet while holding the handles.
- While she was stretching the rope by raising her legs, it slipped off the soles of her feet.
- The stretched rope recoiled and struck Jamieson in the eye, causing a serious injury (a detached retina).
Procedural Posture:
- Marguerite Jamieson sued Woodward & Lothrop (vendor) for breach of warranty and Helena Rubinstein, Inc. (manufacturer) for negligence in the U.S. District Court.
- After the defendants answered the complaint and Jamieson's deposition was taken, the defendants moved for summary judgment.
- The District Court (the trial court) granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, dismissing the case.
- Jamieson (as appellant) appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a manufacturer have a legal duty to warn consumers of the obvious danger that a simple, non-defective product, like a rubber exercise rope, may cause injury if it slips during normal use?
Opinions:
Majority - Prettyman, J.
No, a manufacturer does not have a legal duty to warn of obvious dangers inherent in the use of a simple product. The law does not require a product to be accident-proof, and a manufacturer is not obligated to warn of universally known characteristics, such as the fact that a stretched elastic rope will snap back if released. The court reasoned that the danger posed by the exerciser was not latent but obvious to any possible user. Analogizing the rubber rope to other simple objects like a hammer or a knife, the court explained that manufacturers are not liable for injuries resulting from a mishap in normal use, such as a slip, when the product itself is not defective. Citing Campo v. Scofield, the court affirmed that a manufacturer's duty is to guard against hidden defects and concealed dangers, not obvious perils. Since the propensity of an elastic rope to snap back is common knowledge, Helena Rubinstein had no duty to warn Mrs. Jamieson of that possibility.
Dissenting - Washington, J.
Yes, a manufacturer who directs a consumer to use a product in a specific manner that creates an unreasonable risk of injury has a duty to warn or otherwise protect the user from that danger. The dissent argued that the central issue was not the general properties of rubber, but the specific danger created when using the Lithe-Line for the 'Tummy Flattener' exercise as directed by the manufacturer. A user might not appreciate the significant force of the recoil or the likelihood of it striking their face. Furthermore, the manufacturer's advertising, which promoted the product as fun and easy to use, could lull users into a false sense of security. The question of whether the danger was so obvious as to negate the duty to warn should have been a question of fact for a jury to decide, not a matter of law determined by a judge on summary judgment.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the “patent danger” or “obvious danger” rule in products liability law, which limits a manufacturer's duty to warn. The decision establishes that for simple, non-defective products, the law presumes users are aware of obvious risks, thereby shifting responsibility for mishaps to the user. This precedent prevents manufacturers from becoming insurers against all possible injuries and draws a clear line between latent dangers, which require warnings, and patent dangers, which do not. The ruling emphasizes the role of the judge in making a threshold determination of legal duty before a negligence case can proceed to a jury, preventing litigation based on accidents arising from common knowledge risks.
