Marchl v. Dowling Co., Inc.
157 Pa. Super. 91, 1945 Pa. Super. LEXIS 307, 41 A.2d 427 (1944)
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Rule of Law:
An initial act of negligence that creates a hazardous condition, such as illegally parking a vehicle in a way that obstructs vision, can be a proximate cause of an injury, and liability for that act is not superseded by the subsequent negligence of another actor if the initial negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
Facts:
- Dowling & Company, Inc. double-parked its large, canvas-sided truck on the westerly side of Walnut Street, facing south.
- The truck was parked illegally in violation of a city ordinance and state statute, obstructing the view of traffic approaching from the north.
- A seven-year-old girl, the minor plaintiff, walked south on the sidewalk and prepared to cross Walnut Street from west to east at an alley intersection.
- After checking for traffic from the south, she walked into the street past the line of Dowling's parked truck in order to see if traffic was approaching from the north.
- As soon as she could see past the truck, she saw a car driven by Boyd E. Bowers, which was almost on top of her.
- Bowers, the driver, appeared to have his head turned and was not looking at the road.
- Bowers' car struck the minor plaintiff before she had an opportunity to move out of the way.
Procedural Posture:
- The minor plaintiff and her parents sued Boyd E. Bowers and Dowling & Company, Inc., in a trial court for negligence.
- A jury trial resulted in verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs against both defendants.
- Both defendants filed separate motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.).
- The trial court refused both motions and entered judgments on the jury verdicts.
- Dowling & Company, Inc., acting as the appellant, appealed the trial court's refusal of its motion for judgment n.o.v. to the intermediate appellate court.
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Issue:
Does the act of illegally parking a truck, which obstructs a pedestrian's view, constitute a proximate cause of an accident when the pedestrian is subsequently struck by a different, negligent driver, or is the second driver's negligence a superseding cause that relieves the owner of the parked truck from liability?
Opinions:
Majority - Rhodes, J.
No. The illegal parking of the truck was a proximate cause of the accident, and the subsequent negligence of the other driver was a concurrent, not a superseding, cause. The court reasoned that Dowling & Company's violation of parking statutes constituted negligence per se. This negligence was a causal and substantial factor in the minor plaintiff's injury because the illegally parked truck created a perilous position for any pedestrian attempting to cross the street. The harm that occurred was a reasonably foreseeable result of obstructing the view of both pedestrians and drivers. The court distinguished this from cases where a second actor's negligence is a superseding cause, stating that here, Dowling's negligence first put the plaintiff in peril, and Bowers' subsequent negligence merely turned that peril into actual injury, making them concurrent causes.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal doctrine of concurrent negligence and clarifies the limits of the superseding cause defense. It establishes that a party who creates a continuous and foreseeable hazard cannot escape liability merely because another party's subsequent negligence was the final act in the chain of causation. The case is significant for tort law as it underscores that if an initial negligent act is a 'substantial factor' in causing harm, the original tortfeasor can be held jointly liable. This principle is crucial in multi-party accident cases, preventing defendants from shifting all blame to the most immediate cause when their own negligence created the underlying danger.
