MARBLE TECHNOLOGIES v. City of Hampton
2010 Va. LEXIS 32, 690 S.E.2d 84, 279 Va. 409 (2010)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under the Dillon Rule, a local government's power is limited to that which is expressly granted or necessarily implied by the state legislature; therefore, a locality may not use criteria for land use designation that are not authorized by the enabling state statute or its designated regulatory body.
Facts:
- The Virginia General Assembly enacted the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act (the Act), which required certain localities, including the City of Hampton, to establish Chesapeake Bay Preservation Areas.
- The Act authorized the Chesapeake Bay Local Assistance Board (the Board) to promulgate regulations establishing the specific criteria localities must use to designate these areas, which include Resource Protection Areas (RPAs).
- The Board's criteria for RPAs include tidal wetlands, tidal shores, and a buffer area of at least 100 feet, but do not mention any federal land designations.
- Marble Technologies, Inc. and Shri Ganesh, LLC (plaintiffs) own parcels of land in Hampton that are designated as part of the federal Coastal Barrier Resources System.
- In 2008, the City of Hampton amended its zoning ordinance to automatically include all 'lands designated as part of the Coastal Barrier Resources System' within its RPA buffer area.
- As a direct result of Hampton's amendment, the plaintiffs' properties became subject to the more stringent development restrictions of an RPA.
Procedural Posture:
- Marble Technologies, Inc. and Shri Ganesh, LLC sued the City of Hampton in the local circuit court (a trial court), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to block enforcement of a zoning amendment.
- The City filed a demurrer to the complaint.
- The circuit court sustained the demurrer as to the request for injunctive relief but overruled it as to the request for a declaratory judgment on the City's authority.
- Both parties subsequently filed motions for summary judgment.
- The circuit court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion, ruling the zoning amendment was valid.
- The plaintiffs (as appellants) appealed the circuit court's final judgment to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a local government, under Virginia's Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, have the authority to use a property's designation under the federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act as a criterion for including it within a state-mandated Resource Protection Area?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kinser
No. A local government does not have the authority to use a property's designation under the federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act as a criterion for its state-mandated Resource Protection Area because such authority is not expressly or impliedly granted by the state. Virginia operates under the Dillon Rule, which strictly construes the powers of local governments, limiting them to those expressly granted by the General Assembly, those necessarily or fairly implied from express powers, and those essential to the locality's declared purposes. The Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act explicitly mandates that localities 'use the criteria developed by the Board' to define preservation areas. The Board's established criteria do not include or reference designation under the federal Act. By incorporating this external federal standard, the City of Hampton exceeded its delegated authority, rendering the zoning amendment void.
Analysis:
This case serves as a quintessential application of Virginia's Dillon Rule, reinforcing the principle that local governments are creatures of the state with limited, delegated powers. The decision clarifies that in a state-mandated regulatory scheme like the Chesapeake Bay Preservation Act, localities lack the discretion to supplement or modify the specific criteria established by the state's designated agency. This holding limits local autonomy in environmental regulation, ensuring uniformity across jurisdictions and preventing localities from incorporating federal standards or other external criteria unless explicitly authorized by the state legislature. Future cases involving local ordinances will continue to face this strict scrutiny, where any doubt regarding a locality's power is resolved against its existence.
