Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner
1988 Tex. App. LEXIS 43, 1988 WL 1464, 745 S.W.2d 420 (1988)
Rule of Law:
Interference with a contract is not tortious if it is justified by the interferer's bona fide exercise of its own rights or a superior right in the subject matter, even if the interference is accompanied by ill will.
Facts:
- In 1975, James Sterner, a boilermaker, was injured from gas inhalation on Marathon Oil Company's (Marathon's) premises while working for Morris Construction Company.
- Sterner had a pre-existing history of significant medical conditions, including paralysis in his left arm, knee injuries, a spinal injury, a neck/disc injury, and hypertension, which restricted his physical abilities like climbing.
- The 1975 gas inhalation incident further exacerbated Sterner's health problems, causing chest pains, difficulty breathing, dizziness, and light-headedness, making climbing difficult or impossible and leading to previous job terminations due to inability to work.
- In 1980, Sterner sued Marathon for the 1975 injury, and a jury found in his favor, awarding $25,000 in damages.
- In November 1980, Marathon contracted with Ford, Bacon & Davis (contractor) for construction work at its refinery.
- The union sent Sterner to work for Ford, Bacon & Davis on Marathon's premises.
- On his second day of work, Sterner felt sick, became dizzy, and left the plant, encountering a Marathon safety personnel who questioned his presence and stated, 'not if he had anything to say about it.'
- The next morning, Sterner was terminated by Ford, Bacon & Davis, receiving a 'pink slip' indicating the reason for termination as 'per Marathon’s directive.'
Procedural Posture:
- Sterner filed a prior lawsuit against Marathon Oil Company in 1980 for injuries sustained in 1975, where a jury awarded him $25,000.
- Marathon appealed the 1980 judgment, which was affirmed.
- Sterner filed the present lawsuit against Marathon Oil Company in trial court, alleging tortious interference with his employment contract.
- The trial court submitted the case to a jury, which found that Marathon interfered with Sterner's employment and that such interference was not justified or legally excused.
- Marathon filed a motion for directed verdict, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Marathon, as appellant, appealed the judgment entered on the jury findings to the Texas Court of Appeals, Houston (14th Dist.).
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Issue:
Is there sufficient evidence to support a jury finding that an owner's directive to its contractor to terminate an employee was without legal justification or excuse, thereby constituting tortious interference with an employment contract?
Opinions:
Majority - Robertson, Justice
No, there is not sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Marathon's interference was without legal justification or excuse. The court held that there was no evidence that Marathon maliciously interfered without just cause or excuse. While evidence might have suggested Marathon harbored 'ill will' towards Sterner (due to the prior lawsuit and Marathon's preference for its expert's medical opinion), the term 'malice' in the context of tortious interference means an 'act without excuse or just cause,' not merely spite or evil motive. Citing Sakowitz v. Steck and Tidal Western Oil Corp. v. Shackelford, the court reiterated that one is privileged to interfere with a contract if done in a bona fide exercise of one's own rights or if one has an equal or superior right in the subject matter. As the owner of the premises, Marathon was entitled to exercise its right to prohibit workmen from its property whom it believed were physically incapable of performing the required work, especially given Sterner's extensive medical history and acknowledged incapacities, and its concerns for safety. Marathon's position was based on Sterner's own testimony from the 1980 trial regarding his physical limitations and the associated risks. Therefore, Marathon's actions were legally justified, and Sterner failed to prove interference without legal excuse.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the 'justification' defense in claims of tortious interference with contract, particularly in owner-contractor-employee relationships. It underscores that 'malice' in this context requires an act entirely 'without excuse or just cause,' distinguishing it from mere ill will or spite. The ruling grants property owners substantial latitude to protect their premises and operations by barring individuals they reasonably deem a safety risk, thereby impacting a contractor's employment decisions. Future litigation will likely scrutinize the reasonableness and good faith of the asserted justification, emphasizing objective safety concerns over subjective animosity.
