Maples v. Thomas
565 U.S. 266 (2012)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Attorney conduct that constitutes abandonment, which severs the principal-agent relationship between attorney and client, qualifies as 'cause' to excuse a procedural default in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Unlike ordinary attorney negligence, which is attributed to the client, abandonment is an external factor that impeded the client's ability to comply with procedural rules.
Facts:
- Cory R. Maples was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama.
- For his state postconviction proceedings, Maples was represented pro bono by two New York attorneys, Jaasi Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz, from the Sullivan & Cromwell law firm.
- An Alabama attorney, John Butler, was associated as local counsel but informed the New York lawyers that he would have no substantive involvement, only facilitating their admission to practice in Alabama.
- In the summer of 2002, while Maples' petition was pending, both Munanka and Ingen-Housz left Sullivan & Cromwell for new jobs that legally and practically prevented them from continuing to represent Maples.
- Neither attorney informed Maples of their departure, their inability to continue representing him, nor did they formally move to withdraw from the case with the court.
- In May 2003, the state trial court issued an order denying Maples' petition. Notices were mailed to Munanka and Ingen-Housz at their old firm's address.
- A mailroom employee at Sullivan & Cromwell returned the unopened envelopes to the court clerk, who took no further action to ensure notice was received.
- Local counsel John Butler received his copy of the order but took no action, assuming the primary New York attorneys would handle the necessary appeal.
Procedural Posture:
- Cory Maples filed a petition for postconviction relief in an Alabama state trial court, which was denied in May 2003.
- No notice of appeal was filed within the 42-day deadline, resulting in a procedural default.
- Maples, through new counsel from his former attorneys' firm, moved the trial court to reissue its order to restart the appeal clock; the motion was denied.
- Maples petitioned the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals for leave to file an out-of-time appeal, which was denied. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.
- Maples filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
- The District Court denied the petition, finding Maples had procedurally defaulted his claims in state court and had not shown 'cause' to excuse the default.
- Maples appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, where a divided panel affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the facts established cause to excuse Maples' procedural default.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the abandonment of a capital prisoner by his postconviction counsel, without notice to the prisoner or the court, constitute 'cause' sufficient to excuse the procedural default of failing to file a timely notice of appeal?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, the abandonment by counsel constitutes cause to excuse the procedural default. The general rule from Coleman v. Thompson, which holds that attorney negligence in postconviction proceedings is not 'cause' because the attorney is the client's agent, does not apply when the attorney abandons the client. Abandonment severs the principal-agent relationship, meaning the attorney's failures can no longer be attributed to the client. Here, Maples' attorneys of record, Munanka and Ingen-Housz, terminated their agency relationship when they took new jobs that disabled them from continuing representation, and they did so without notice to Maples or the court. The local counsel, Butler, never acted as Maples' agent in any meaningful sense. Because Maples was functionally unrepresented at the critical time for filing his appeal, through no fault of his own, he has demonstrated cause to excuse the default.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, Maples was not abandoned by his attorneys and therefore has not shown cause to excuse the default. Maples was represented by the Sullivan & Cromwell firm as a whole, not just the two associates who left; other lawyers at the firm were involved in his case. Furthermore, local counsel John Butler remained an attorney of record and Maples' agent. The failure of the remaining Sullivan & Cromwell lawyers and Butler to file a timely appeal constitutes attorney error, not abandonment. Under the clear rule of Coleman v. Thompson, such error is attributable to the client. The majority's decision creates an easily exploitable loophole, allowing future petitioners to recharacterize any serious attorney error as 'abandonment' to evade the procedural default bar.
Concurring - Justice Alito
Yes, the unique circumstances of this case amount to an effective abandonment that constitutes cause. This case represents a 'veritable perfect storm of misfortune,' involving a highly unlikely combination of no fewer than eight distinct failures by the attorneys, their law firm, and the court clerk. These combined events, occurring without notice to Maples, effectively deprived him of all legal representation at a critical moment. This abandonment provides sufficient 'cause' to overcome the procedural default, not because of any systemic failure in Alabama's system, but because of this unique and disastrous series of events.
Analysis:
This decision carves out a significant 'abandonment' exception to the formidable procedural default bar established in Coleman v. Thompson. It draws a critical distinction between ordinary attorney negligence, which is imputed to the client, and attorney abandonment, which severs the agency relationship and is considered an external factor constituting 'cause'. The ruling provides a narrow but crucial pathway for federal habeas review when a petitioner is left functionally unrepresented at a critical stage through no fault of their own. Future litigation in this area will likely focus on defining the precise line between egregious negligence and total abandonment.
Unlock the full brief for Maples v. Thomas