Manning v. Brannon
69 O.B.A.J. 1316, 956 P.2d 156, 1998 OK CIV APP 17 (1997)
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Rule of Law:
An exculpatory contract, releasing a party from liability for negligence, is valid and enforceable in Oklahoma if it clearly expresses the intent to release from negligence, is made at arm’s length with no vast disparity of bargaining power, and is not contrary to statute or public policy, particularly in the context of high-risk sports activities.
Facts:
- On September 26, 1992, Clark Manning went to Paradise Sport Parachute Center (Paradise) to learn how to skydive.
- During six hours of training, Clark Manning was given a detailed exculpatory contract, watched a video explaining its terms, and read, signed, and initialed the contract in fourteen places, releasing Paradise from liability for injury or death, even if caused by Paradise's negligence.
- Clark Manning successfully completed one "static line" parachute jump.
- On October 3, 1992, Clark Manning returned and successfully completed a second jump.
- On Clark Manning’s third jump, both his main and reserve chutes malfunctioned by deploying simultaneously, and he cut away his main chute as instructed.
- After cutting away the main chute, Clark Manning's reserve chute failed to fully inflate, he was unable to properly control the jump, and/or he disregarded audio instructions from a ground instructor, leading him to spiral and fall into a shallow pond, sustaining injury.
- Clark Manning alleged Paradise was negligent in failing to properly pack and/or inspect the parachutes, and in failing to adequately train and/or monitor him.
Procedural Posture:
- Clark Manning brought an action against Paradise Sport Parachute Center (Paradise) in a trial court, alleging negligence.
- Paradise answered, denying liability, inter alia, under the exculpatory contract.
- The matter proceeded to trial.
- At the close of Clark Manning's case-in-chief, Paradise interposed a demurrer to the evidence, citing the exculpatory contract as grounds for relief, but the trial court overruled the demurrer.
- At the close of Paradise's defense, Paradise moved for a directed verdict, again asserting no liability under the exculpatory contract, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court submitted the matter to a jury on basic negligence instructions.
- The jury returned a verdict finding both parties 50% negligent and awarded Clark Manning damages.
- The trial court denied Paradise's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
- Paradise appealed the adverse judgment to the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals.
- Clark Manning (appellee) cross-appealed, alleging inadequacy of damages awarded.
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Issue:
Does a clearly worded exculpatory contract, signed by an individual participating in a high-risk sport where there is no disparity in bargaining power and no violation of public policy or specific statutes, validly release the activity provider from liability for ordinary negligence causing personal injury?
Opinions:
Majority - Joplin, Judge
Yes, a clearly worded exculpatory contract signed by an individual participating in a high-risk sport, where there is no disparity in bargaining power and no violation of public policy or specific statutes, does validly release the activity provider from liability for ordinary negligence causing personal injury. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has long recognized the validity and enforceability of exculpatory contracts, applying a three-part test: (1) clear, definite, and unambiguous language expressing intent to excuse negligence; (2) an arm’s-length agreement with no vast disparity of bargaining power; and (3) not contrary to statute or public policy. The court found the contract language, including capitalized headings and specific descriptions of assumed risks (e.g., equipment malfunction, inadequate training), to be clear and unambiguous, a point Manning himself conceded. Regarding bargaining power, Manning failed to adduce evidence that parachuting was essential or that he lacked alternative choices, noting he was offered his money back and other facility names. Finally, the court concluded that exculpatory contracts in high-risk sports are not against Oklahoma public policy, citing similar findings in other jurisdictions and Oklahoma precedent. It also specifically rejected the applicability of 15 O.S.1991 § 212.1, which pertains to unilateral "notices" rather than bargained-for contracts, and 15 O.S.1991 § 212, which only prohibits exemption from willful injury or violation of law, not ordinary negligence, for which there was no evidence presented. Since Manning only presented evidence of ordinary negligence and had knowingly executed a clear exculpatory agreement, the trial court erred by not enforcing the contract. The order of the trial court entering judgment on jury verdict for Manning is therefore REVERSED.
Dissenting - Hansen, Presiding Judge
No, the waiver Manning signed should not, as a matter of law, absolve Paradise from responsibility for their negligent acts, especially given public policy and constitutional provisions. While acknowledging that exculpatory contracts can be valid, the dissent stresses that they are invalid if contrary to public policy. Hansen distinguishes Schmidt v. United States, noting it allowed for jury fact-finding on enforceability, not a blanket legal ruling. Hansen argues that permitting a party to contract away responsibility for severe personal injury resulting from willful or reckless disregard for safety, particularly in activities like parachute packing with a high potential for death, violates Oklahoma's public policy. The dissent cites several Oklahoma Constitutional provisions (Article 23 § 6, Article 2 § 6, Article 23 § 8) and statutory provisions (15 O.S.1991 § 212, 15 O.S.1991 § 211), arguing that these, when read together, reflect a strong public policy for legal responsibility for severe personal injury due to active negligence and mandate that such questions be decided by a jury, not by the court as a matter of law. Hansen cannot agree that Manning assumed all risks, regardless of the degree of Paradise's negligence.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the enforceability of clearly drafted exculpatory contracts in Oklahoma, particularly in the context of high-risk recreational activities. It establishes a robust three-part test for validity, emphasizing clarity, fair bargaining, and compliance with public policy. The ruling limits the scope of public policy exceptions, particularly for ordinary negligence in voluntary, non-essential activities, and clarifies that specific statutes (like § 212.1 and § 212) do not preclude such waivers unless gross negligence or willful misconduct is involved. Future cases will likely use this framework to assess similar waivers, placing a significant burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate unconscionable terms, gross negligence, or a genuine public policy violation beyond ordinary negligence.
