Mann v. Regan
948 A.2d 1075, 108 Conn. App. 566, 2008 Conn. App. LEXIS 322 (2008)
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Rule of Law:
Under the tacit admission exception to the hearsay rule, a person's silence in response to a statement made in their presence may be admissible as an admission of that statement's truth if the circumstances would naturally call for a reply from the silent party.
Facts:
- Mary Anne Mann and Gladys Regan were friends for approximately thirty years.
- Regan owned a Lhasa Apso dog named Sam, which was known to be afraid of strangers, bark at them, and become upset when people leaned over him.
- On December 17, 2004, Regan traveled to Connecticut with Sam, and upon arrival, the dog growled at Mann's friend, Barbara Scanlon, when she reached toward him.
- Regan stayed at Mann's house for a few days before leaving on December 20, 2004, for a wedding, leaving Sam in Mann's care.
- Approximately six hours after Regan left, Mann leaned over Sam to place a blanket under him on the couch, and the dog bit her on the right cheek, causing severe puncture wounds.
- On December 22, 2004, Regan and her daughter, Christina Hahn, went to Mann's house to retrieve the dog.
- During a conversation in the kitchen about the bite, Hahn stated to Regan, 'Well, mom, you know he bit you.'
- Regan, who was standing five feet away and heard the statement, did not respond or deny it.
Procedural Posture:
- Mary Anne Mann sued Gladys Regan in a Connecticut trial court for common-law negligence after Regan's dog bit her.
- The trial court struck a second count in the complaint based on a strict liability 'dog bite' statute.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial on the negligence claim.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mann, awarding damages but also finding Mann 10 percent at fault.
- Regan filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the trial court denied.
- The trial court rendered a final judgment in favor of Mann.
- Regan (appellant) appealed the judgment to the Appellate Court of Connecticut.
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Issue:
Does a party's silence in response to their daughter's statement, 'Well, mom, you know he bit you,' made in their presence during a conversation about the party's dog biting someone, constitute a tacit admission admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule?
Opinions:
Majority - Flynn, C. J.
Yes. The party's silence can be admitted as a tacit admission because the circumstances naturally called for a reply. A failure to contradict a statement made in one's presence can amount to an admission by adoption if the party heard and understood the statement, was able to reply, and the statement was one that would naturally call for an answer. Here, the daughter's statement was made during a conversation about the dog bite, directly following the defendant's expression of disbelief. The court found it reasonable to conclude that a dog owner, upon hearing a statement about her own dog having previously bitten her, would be expected to deny the statement or offer an explanation. The fact that the conversation was among friends is not dispositive; the accusatory nature of the statement in that context is what matters. The court also found sufficient evidence for the jury's negligence verdict, noting the dog's known behaviors and the tacitly admitted prior bite, and held that the jury instruction using 'dangerous' instead of 'vicious' propensities was not improper as there is no meaningful legal distinction between the terms in this context.
Analysis:
This case provides a clear application of the tacit admission rule, emphasizing that the context of a statement, rather than the relationship between the parties, determines whether silence can be construed as an admission. It affirms that even in an informal setting, a direct, accusatory statement can create circumstances where a reasonable person would be expected to reply, making their silence admissible evidence. The decision also solidifies that in common-law dog bite negligence cases, terms like 'dangerous' and 'vicious' propensities are largely interchangeable, preventing defendants from escaping liability based on semantic distinctions and focusing the inquiry on the owner's knowledge of any propensity likely to cause injury.
