Mann v. Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Co.
290 S.W.2d 820 (1955)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A property owner may owe a duty of ordinary care to take reasonable precautions to protect young children from dangerous conditions on their premises, even if the children are technically trespassers, if the owner knows or should know that children are likely to trespass and encounter a condition that is dangerous and appealing to them, and safeguards can be provided at reasonable cost.
Facts:
- Charles Mann, a two-and-a-half-year-old child, lived in a cottage immediately adjoining the switchyard of the Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Company in Louisville.
- The switchyard, containing 48 tracks, bisected Rowan Street, which ended openly and without any barrier directly at the railroad tracks on the east side, while the west side had a high, woven wire fence.
- Approximately 35 to 40 children lived in the single block of Rowan Street just east of the tracks.
- Railroad employees admitted knowing about the dense population, including many children, on Rowan Street, and were aware that people, including men and boys, habitually used footpaths across the yard.
- The railroad operated its classification yard by 'gravity switching,' where unattached and unattended tank cars rolled down tracks with little noise and no warning devices.
- Charles Mann left his home, apparently following his dog, and went 125 feet onto the third track in the switchyard, about 37 feet from the end of Rowan Street.
- Before his grandmother and aunt could reach him, Charles Mann was struck by a coasting tank car, resulting in the loss of his right arm and right leg.
- The railroad employees occasionally chased children off the tracks when they were seen, but there was no permanent barrier to prevent entry.
Procedural Posture:
- A suit for damages was instituted in Charles Mann's behalf against the Kentucky & Indiana Terminal Railroad Company in a trial court.
- At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, the Railroad Company.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a railroad company owe a duty of ordinary care to take precautions to safeguard young children from the dangers of its switchyard operations when the yard is open and accessible in a thickly populated residential area with many children, and the company knows or should know that children are likely to be present?
Opinions:
Majority - Stanley, Commissioner
Yes, a railroad company owes a duty of ordinary care to take precautions to safeguard young children from the dangers of its switchyard operations when the yard is open and accessible in a thickly populated residential area with many children, and the company knows or should know that children are likely to be present. The court reversed the directed verdict, holding that the case should have been submitted to a jury. While generally nonliability for injuries to trespassers applies to infants, exceptions exist where premises maintain something dangerous to children so exposed that contact is likely. This case falls under the concept of legal duty based on the reasonable anticipation that children might be exposed to danger, imposing a duty to take precautions. The court distinguished this from a strict 'attractive nuisance' but recognized it as an extension of that doctrine. The court emphasized that the railroad's knowledge of the dense population, the open and unprotected end of Rowan Street, the frequent presence of children, and the inherently dangerous 'gravity switching' operations created a duty of care. Even though state law does not require fencing in cities, common law diligence can still impose such a duty under particular circumstances. It was the jury's province to determine if the railroad failed its legal duty and if that failure was the proximate cause of the child's injury.
Dissenting - Sims, Judge
No, a railroad company does not owe a duty of ordinary care to take precautions to safeguard young children from the dangers of its switchyard operations under these circumstances, and the trial judge correctly directed a verdict for the company. The dissenting opinion argues that the majority did not explicitly hold the switchyard to be an attractive nuisance, nor did it find negligence in the gravity switching itself. Judge Sims highlighted that state statutes do not require railroads to fence rights of way in cities or across private pathways. He contended that merely fencing the end of Rowan Street would be ineffective, requiring the fencing of the entire east side of the yard, which the law does not mandate. The dissent noted that the record did not show children customarily played in the switchyard, but rather were run out by the company's nine patrolmen. Judge Sims asserted that the company could not reasonably anticipate a 2.5-year-old child would stray onto its property, especially unattended. He reiterated the general rule that trespassing children are treated like trespassing adults, liable only for negligence after discovering their peril, absent an attractive nuisance doctrine, which he believed the majority did not apply. The dissent concluded that imposing such a duty would be an unreasonable burden on the railroad and that the company had no duty to act as a 'nursemaid' to all small children.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and potentially expands the scope of premises liability, particularly concerning children as trespassers. It moves beyond the strict 'attractive nuisance' doctrine to a broader principle of reasonable anticipation of child presence in dangerous areas. The ruling emphasizes the importance of common law duties of care even where statutory obligations may be absent, particularly when property owners have knowledge of foreseeable risks to vulnerable populations like young children. Future cases may rely on this precedent to impose a duty on landowners to take proactive safety measures in densely populated areas, compelling them to consider the real-world accessibility and appeal of dangerous conditions to children, even if the children are technically trespassing.
