Manduley v. Superior Court
117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 168, 41 P.3d 3, 27 Cal. 4th 537 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A prosecutor's discretionary decision to directly file felony charges against certain minors in criminal court, bypassing a juvenile court fitness hearing (as authorized by Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d)), does not violate the separation of powers, due process, or equal protection clauses of the California or federal constitutions, nor does Proposition 21, which enacted section 707(d), violate the single-subject rule of the California Constitution.
Facts:
- Proposition 21, titled the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, was approved by California voters at the March 7, 2000, Primary Election.
- Proposition 21 included Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) (section 707(d)), which broadened the circumstances in which prosecutors are authorized to file charges against minors 14 years of age and older directly in the criminal division of the superior court.
- Prior to Proposition 21, minors were generally subject to the juvenile court system unless a juvenile court judge determined, after a hearing, that the minor was unfit for juvenile court treatment or if they were 16 years of age or older and accused of certain serious crimes.
- Petitioners are eight minors accused of committing various felony offenses, including assault with a deadly weapon, willful infliction of injury upon an elder, and robbery.
- The complaint alleged that the petitioners' crimes were committed due to the victims' race, color, religion, nationality, country of origin, ancestry, gender, disability, or sexual orientation, and while petitioners acted in concert.
- Four of the petitioners were 16 years of age or older and the remaining four were 14 years of age or older at the time they committed the alleged offenses.
Procedural Posture:
- The People filed a single felony complaint in the superior court, charging the eight petitioners with various felonies.
- Petitioners demurred to the complaint in the superior court, contending that Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(d) was unconstitutional on several grounds (separation of powers, due process, equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, and single-subject rule).
- The superior court overruled the demurrers, finding section 707(d) constitutional on all grounds presented.
- Petitioners Manduley and Rose filed separate petitions for writ of mandate and/or prohibition in the Court of Appeal, seeking an order dismissing the criminal complaint and transferring the matter to juvenile court.
- The Court of Appeal granted joint motions for all petitioners to join, consolidated the petitions, stayed the arraignments of petitioners, and issued an order to show cause.
- The Court of Appeal, in a two-to-one decision, held that section 707(d) violates the separation of powers doctrine and directed the superior court to vacate its ruling and sustain the demurrers; it did not resolve other constitutional issues raised by petitioners.
- The People sought review of the Court of Appeal’s resolution of the separation of powers question in the Supreme Court of California.
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Issue:
Does Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d), which grants prosecutors the discretion to directly file felony charges against certain minors in criminal court without a prior judicial fitness hearing, violate the separation of powers doctrine, due process, or equal protection clauses, or does Proposition 21, which enacted section 707(d), violate the single-subject rule of the California Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - George, C.J.
No, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) and Proposition 21 do not violate the separation of powers, due process, equal protection clauses, or the single-subject rule. The Court concluded that a prosecutor’s decision to file charges against a minor in criminal court pursuant to section 707(d) is a pre-filing charging decision, which is well within the established charging authority of the executive branch. This exercise of discretion, made before any judicial proceeding is commenced, does not usurp an exclusively judicial power, even if it effectively precludes the court from selecting a particular sentencing alternative, distinguishing cases where prosecutorial veto occurred post-commencement of judicial proceedings. The Court found no due process violation, reasoning that minors who commit crimes under the circumstances set forth in section 707(d) do not possess any statutory or constitutional right to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, thus no protected liberty interest triggers the need for a judicial fitness hearing. The equal protection claim was also rejected; while prosecutorial discretion may result in different treatment for similarly situated minors, this does not violate equal protection absent a showing of invidious discrimination. Finally, Proposition 21 was found not to violate the single-subject rule, as its various provisions regarding gang violence, repeat offenders, and juvenile justice are 'reasonably germane' to the common purpose of addressing violent crime committed by juveniles and gangs, and voters were adequately informed of its contents through the ballot pamphlet.
Dissenting - Kennard, J.
Yes, Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (d) violates the separation of powers doctrine of the California Constitution. Justice Kennard argued that historically, the decision to transfer a minor to adult court was an exclusively judicial function, requiring a neutral body to determine fitness. Proposition 21, by granting prosecutors arbitrary and unreviewable discretion without legislatively prescribed standards, a hearing, or the right to counsel, eliminates an essential check to arbitrary executive power. The crucial nature and consequence of the decision—determining whether a minor faces a system stressing punishment or rehabilitation—makes it judicial, regardless of whether it occurs before or after charges are filed. The absence of judicial review for this significant decision by an advocate, not an impartial adjudicator, is inconsistent with the separation of powers doctrine and concerns expressed in prior cases like People v. Tenorio.
Concurring - Werdegar, J.
I concur in the judgment that Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject rule. Justice Werdegar acknowledged that some specific crimes added to the 'Three Strikes' list by Proposition 21 (e.g., assault with a deadly weapon, residential burglary) might be of 'doubtful germaneness' if viewed in isolation from the initiative's overall subject of gang and juvenile violence. However, she concluded that the single-subject rule should not be interpreted in an 'unduly narrow or restrictive fashion.' The changes to the 'Three Strikes' lock-in date, necessary to incorporate new felonies as 'strikes,' had incidental collateral effects. Given that the vast majority of Proposition 21's strike-related changes were indeed related to gang and juvenile violence, and requiring extreme precision for every provision in a comprehensive reform measure would be unrealistic, the initiative's inclusion of these few doubtfully germane provisions should not invalidate it under the single-subject rule.
Concurring - Moreno, J.
I concur in parts I through V of the majority opinion and concur in the result that Proposition 21 does not violate the single-subject rule, but I take issue with much of the majority's analysis and the court's prior interpretation of the single-subject rule. Justice Moreno contended that the court's 'liberally interpreted 'reasonably germane'' test for the single-subject rule, borrowed from legislative standards, is too lax for initiatives, which lack the scrutiny and amendment opportunities of the legislative process. He argued for a stricter test focused on voter clarity and preventing 'logrolling,' questioning whether a 'reasonable voter' would be 'surprised' by certain provisions or if they are clearly expressed in the initiative's title and summary. While he found the juvenile justice and gang-related provisions to be sufficiently germane, he expressed concern that many of the 'Three Strikes' amendments had no apparent relation to juvenile or gang crime and were not adequately highlighted to voters. Nevertheless, he ultimately concurred in the result because he identified a 'functional relationship' where the amendments to Penal Code sections 667.5 and 1192.7 impact Welfare and Institutions Code section 1732.6, which governs whether a minor can be committed to the Youth Authority, thus linking them to the initiative's goal of juvenile justice reform.
Analysis:
This landmark decision fundamentally altered the landscape of juvenile justice in California by affirming the broad scope of prosecutorial charging discretion, even when that discretion profoundly impacts sentencing and dispositional options for minors. It reinforces the legal principle that pre-filing decisions are largely executive functions, thereby setting a high bar for due process and equal protection challenges in that context. The ruling on the single-subject rule provides a framework for future initiatives, allowing for comprehensive criminal justice reforms within a single measure, provided there is a reasonably germane common purpose. This case will likely influence future litigation concerning the boundaries of executive power, the rights of minors in the criminal justice system, and the scope of voter-approved initiatives.
