Mancusi v. DeForte
392 U.S. 364, 88 S. Ct. 2120, 1968 U.S. LEXIS 3075 (1968)
Rule of Law:
An individual has Fourth Amendment standing to challenge a warrantless search and seizure of union records from a shared office where they work and have custody of the papers, as such a space carries a reasonable expectation of privacy. A District Attorney's subpoena duces tecum does not qualify as a valid search warrant.
Facts:
- In 1959, Frank DeForte, a vice president of Teamsters Union Local 266, was indicted in Nassau County, New York, on charges of conspiracy, coercion, and extortion, for allegedly misusing his union office to compel juke box owners to pay tribute.
- Prior to the indictment, the Nassau County District Attorney’s office issued a subpoena duces tecum to Local 266, ordering it to produce certain books and records.
- The subpoena was served upon the Union at its offices, but the Union refused to comply.
- State officials then conducted a search and seized union records from an office shared by DeForte and several other union officials.
- The search and seizure occurred without a warrant and took place despite DeForte's protests, as he was present in the office at the time.
- DeForte spent a considerable amount of time in the office and had custody of the papers at the moment of their seizure.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank DeForte was indicted in Nassau County, New York, on various criminal charges.
- At trial, seized union records were admitted against DeForte, and he was subsequently convicted.
- DeForte appealed his conviction to the New York courts, arguing that the seized material was constitutionally inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio because the search and seizure were warrantless; these appeals were unsuccessful.
- DeForte then brought a federal habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York, raising the same contention.
- The District Court denied the writ of habeas corpus.
- DeForte appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision and directed that the writ issue.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari upon the State's petition.
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Issue:
Does a union official, who shares an office and has custody of union records, have Fourth Amendment standing to object to the warrantless seizure of those records from the office, and is a search conducted under a District Attorney's subpoena duces tecum an 'unreasonable' search?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes, DeForte had Fourth Amendment standing to object to the admission of the papers at his trial, and the search was unreasonable. The Fourth Amendment's protection extends to commercial premises, and standing does not require title to the searched premises but rather a reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusion, as established in Katz v. United States. DeForte, though sharing an office, could reasonably expect that only authorized persons would enter and that records would not be touched without permission. This expectation was defeated by the state officials' actions. The situation was not fundamentally changed because DeForte shared the office; his reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the records in his custody was sufficient for standing. The search was unreasonable because it was conducted without a warrant, and a District Attorney's subpoena duces tecum does not qualify as a valid search warrant under the Fourth Amendment because it is not issued by a neutral and detached magistrate. The State did not provide any other justification for the warrantless search.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Black
No, DeForte did not have standing to object to the use of the union papers against him. Historically, Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and a defendant has no standing to object to the use of papers belonging to someone else, even if seized illegally. Cases like Wilson v. United States and United States v. White have affirmed that corporate or union officers do not have personal Fourth or Fifth Amendment claims regarding organizational papers. The injuries from such an invasion are to the corporation or union, not the individual agent. The majority's broad interpretation of 'anyone legitimately on premises' from Jones v. United States is taken out of context; standing should only be granted to a 'victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed.' Here, the search was directed at the Union to obtain union papers, not at DeForte personally, and the records were not from an area exclusively used by him for private purposes.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
No, the Court's extension of the protected area to the entire office is incorrect. While the Fourth Amendment might protect an individual's private desk within a shared union office, I dissent from the Court's decision to extend this protected area to include the general office space.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the concept of Fourth Amendment standing, particularly in a professional, shared workspace context. It solidified the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz v. United States by applying it to an individual in a non-exclusive work environment. The ruling reinforced that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places or property rights alone, extending privacy expectations beyond one's home to areas where individuals spend significant time and have custody of items. Furthermore, it firmly established that a prosecutor's subpoena cannot circumvent the warrant requirement, emphasizing the critical role of a neutral magistrate in authorizing searches, thereby limiting the power of law enforcement in investigations.
