Malloy v. Hogan
378 U.S. 1 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
The Fifth Amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is made applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Consequently, the same federal standards for determining the validity of a claim of privilege must be applied in both state and federal proceedings.
Facts:
- In 1959, William Malloy was arrested during a gambling raid conducted by Hartford, Connecticut police.
- Malloy pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor crime of pool selling and was sentenced.
- Approximately 16 months after his guilty plea, a state-appointed referee ordered Malloy to testify as part of an official inquiry into alleged gambling and other criminal activities in the county.
- During the inquiry, Malloy was asked questions regarding the circumstances of his 1959 arrest, including who employed him, who paid his legal fees and bond, and whether he knew a specific individual named John Bergoti.
- Malloy refused to answer any of the questions, asserting that his answers might tend to incriminate him.
Procedural Posture:
- The Superior Court of Hartford County adjudged Malloy in contempt for his refusal to answer questions and committed him to prison until he was willing to testify.
- Malloy's application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Superior Court.
- Malloy, as appellant, appealed the denial to the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, the state's highest court.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to state proceedings and Malloy had not properly invoked his state privilege.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors.
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Issue:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, thereby preventing a state from compelling a witness to provide testimony that might incriminate them under state law?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination, making it applicable to the states. The Court's prior holdings in Twining v. New Jersey and Adamson v. California are overruled. The Court reasoned that the American system of criminal justice is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and the privilege against self-incrimination is its essential mainstay. This principle has been reflected in the Court's progressive incorporation of other Bill of Rights protections, such as the right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright and the exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio. The Court held it would be incongruous to apply a 'watered-down' version of the privilege in state courts, and therefore the same federal standards must be used to assess the validity of a privilege claim. Applying the federal standard from Hoffman v. United States, the Court found that the questions asked of Malloy, in the context of a wide-ranging criminal inquiry, could have furnished a link in a chain of evidence needed to prosecute him for a more recent crime.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Harlan
No. The Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination against the states in its entirety, along with the full body of federal doctrine. The majority's approach of 'selective incorporation' forces a compelled uniformity that is inconsistent with the principles of federalism and encroaches on the sovereign powers of the states to define and prosecute local crime. The Court's line of coerced confession cases was based on fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, not on an implicit incorporation of the Fifth Amendment. The proper inquiry should have been whether Connecticut's proceedings violated the demands of fundamental fairness, not whether they adhered to a rigid federal standard. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors carefully and reasonably analyzed Malloy's claim and its conclusion should have been respected.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
No. Even applying the federal standard, Malloy's claim of privilege was not valid and should have been denied. The majority's application of the standard is so broad that it essentially makes any witness's invocation of the privilege automatic, removing the judge's role in making a meaningful determination of whether a real danger of incrimination exists. The questions posed to Malloy related to a 1959 misdemeanor for which the statute of limitations had run. It is purely speculative to assume that answering questions about his associates from that time would incriminate him in a more recent crime, especially since Malloy offered no explanation for his fears. This ruling erodes the content of the federal standard while claiming to apply it, setting a poor precedent for its application to the states.
Analysis:
This decision is a landmark case in the doctrine of selective incorporation, fundamentally altering the relationship between the Bill of Rights and state criminal procedure. By explicitly overturning its precedent in Twining v. New Jersey, the Warren Court continued its trend of nationalizing criminal procedure rights, ensuring uniform protection against self-incrimination across the country. The ruling solidified the principle that the American justice system is accusatorial at its core, requiring the government to prove guilt independently without compelling assistance from the accused. This decision has had a lasting impact, serving as a cornerstone for subsequent rulings, including Miranda v. Arizona, which established the now-famous warnings required during custodial interrogations.
