Mallory v. Norfolk Southern R. Co
600 U.S. 122 (2023)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit a state from requiring an out-of-state corporation to agree to appear in that state's courts for any lawsuit, even one unrelated to its in-state activities, as a condition of registering to do business there.
Facts:
- Robert Mallory worked as a freight-car mechanic for Norfolk Southern Railway Co. for nearly 20 years.
- His employment with Norfolk Southern took place first in Ohio and later in Virginia.
- During his work, Mallory alleges he was exposed to carcinogens, such as asbestos, while spraying boxcar pipes and handling chemicals.
- After leaving the company, Mallory was diagnosed with cancer.
- At the time he filed his lawsuit, Mallory was a resident of Virginia.
- Norfolk Southern is incorporated and headquartered in Virginia.
- Norfolk Southern registered to do business in Pennsylvania and maintains extensive operations there, including thousands of miles of track, numerous rail yards, and locomotive repair shops.
Procedural Posture:
- Robert Mallory filed suit against Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in a Pennsylvania state trial court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
- Norfolk Southern filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that exercising jurisdiction would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The trial court granted Norfolk Southern's motion and dismissed the case.
- Mallory, as appellant, appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that the state's registration-jurisdiction statute was unconstitutional because the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe and its progeny had implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire.
- Mallory petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a state court from exercising personal jurisdiction over a corporation that has consented to suit in that state by registering to do business there, even if the case does not arise from the corporation's in-state activities?
Opinions:
Majority - Gorsuch, J.
No. A state law conditioning the right to do business on a foreign corporation's consent to suit in the state's courts on any claim does not violate the Due Process Clause. This case is directly controlled by the Court's precedent in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co. (1917), which held that such consent-based jurisdiction is constitutional. The Court's later decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington established an additional path for jurisdiction over non-consenting defendants based on 'minimum contacts' but did not eliminate traditional bases for jurisdiction like consent. By registering to do business in Pennsylvania pursuant to a state law explicitly providing for general jurisdiction, Norfolk Southern consented to suit there. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court erred by failing to follow the directly controlling precedent of Pennsylvania Fire.
Concurring - Jackson, J.
No. The requirement of personal jurisdiction is an individual, waivable right. As established in Insurance Corp. of Ireland, a defendant can waive this right through actions that amount to a legal submission to a court's jurisdiction. Norfolk Southern voluntarily waived its personal jurisdiction defense by choosing to register as a foreign corporation in Pennsylvania with full knowledge that state law linked registration to consent for general personal jurisdiction. Having accepted the benefits of doing business in the Commonwealth under these known conditions, Norfolk Southern cannot now claim a due process violation.
Concurring - Alito, J.
No. The Due Process Clause claim is foreclosed by the clear precedent of Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., which has not been overruled and is factually indistinguishable from this case. The Court's modern personal jurisdiction cases, beginning with International Shoe, address jurisdiction over non-consenting defendants and thus do not conflict with the consent-based holding of Pennsylvania Fire. However, while there is no due process violation, asserting jurisdiction in a case with no connection to the forum state raises significant federalism concerns that are more appropriately analyzed under the dormant Commerce Clause, an issue which should be considered on remand.
Dissenting - Barrett, J.
Yes. Pennsylvania's law violates the Due Process Clause by contravening 75 years of precedent establishing that general personal jurisdiction is only permissible where a corporation is 'at home' (its place of incorporation or principal place of business). The majority's 'consent' theory resurrects a legal fiction that International Shoe and its progeny explicitly abandoned. Allowing a state to manufacture consent through a mandatory registration statute effectively nullifies the Court's holdings in Daimler and Goodyear, which limit the reach of general jurisdiction. Pennsylvania Fire is a pre-International Shoe decision that is inconsistent with the modern standard and should be considered overruled.
Analysis:
This decision marks a significant revival of the 'consent' theory of general personal jurisdiction for corporations, creating a jurisdictional pathway independent of the 'at home' analysis established in Goodyear and Daimler. By reaffirming the validity of Pennsylvania Fire, the Court allows states to condition the right to do business on a corporation's consent to suit on any claim, potentially exposing national corporations to general jurisdiction in every state where they are registered. This outcome could dramatically expand the venues available for plaintiffs to sue large corporations, shifting litigation toward plaintiff-friendly jurisdictions. Justice Alito's concurrence flags the dormant Commerce Clause as a potential future battleground for challenging these registration-based jurisdiction statutes on federalism grounds.
