Mallin v. Farmers Insurance Exchange
108 Nev. 788, 839 P.2d 105, 1992 Nev. LEXIS 153 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
For the purpose of an insurance policy's 'intentional acts' exclusion, an act is considered intentional if the insured had the design or desire to cause the consequences of the act and a belief that those consequences were substantially certain to result. An alleged inability to control one's actions due to emotional distress or an 'irresistible impulse' does not negate the intent required to trigger such an exclusion.
Facts:
- Alex Egyed was experiencing marital difficulties with his wife, Virginia Mallin.
- On the evening of the incident, Mallin decided to stay at her friend Nina Schwartz's home instead of with Egyed.
- Mallin, accompanied by friends Nina Schwartz, Betty Di Fiore, and Jack Levy, went to the home she shared with Egyed to pick up her daughter, Jessica.
- At the house, Egyed confronted Mallin, but she refused to speak with him.
- Egyed then retrieved a gun and shot Di Fiore in the head, killing her in his daughter's room.
- He proceeded downstairs and shot his wife, Virginia Mallin, in the head, killing her.
- Egyed then went outside to a car occupied by Jack Levy and Nina Schwartz and shot Levy in the head, killing him.
- After killing the three individuals, Egyed returned to the house and shot and killed himself.
Procedural Posture:
- The personal representatives of the three deceased victims filed claims against the estate of the insured, Alex Egyed.
- Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), Egyed's homeowner's insurer, filed a declaratory relief action in the trial court against Egyed's estate and the victims' representatives.
- In its action, Farmers sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the estate because the killings were 'intentional acts' excluded from coverage under the policy.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmers.
- The personal representatives of the victims (appellants) appealed the summary judgment to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
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Issue:
Does an insured's act of shooting and killing three people, allegedly while suffering from a mental condition that rendered him unable to control his actions, fall under a homeowner's insurance policy exclusion for 'intentional acts'?
Opinions:
Majority - Springer, J.
Yes. The act falls under the exclusion for 'intentional acts' because the term 'intent' denotes a design or desire to cause the consequences of one's acts, a standard which was met here. The court reasoned that Egyed's actions of shooting three people in the head were clearly intentional, as supported by testimony from the claimants' own expert that Egyed 'intended to kill' his victims. The court rejected the argument that an 'irresistible impulse' or inability to control one's actions due to emotional distress negates intent for the purposes of a civil insurance contract. Drawing a distinction from criminal law, the court held that Nevada has rejected volitional defenses like 'irresistible impulse' and that these psychoanalytical theories should not be used to transform an intentional act into an accidental one covered by insurance.
Dissenting - Handelsman, D. J.
No. A genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the insured's acts were 'intentional' under the policy exclusion, making summary judgment improper. The dissent argued that the term 'intentional acts' in the policy is ambiguous as to whether it includes acts committed by an insane person, and any ambiguity must be construed against the insurer. The appellants presented considerable evidence from lay and expert witnesses suggesting that Egyed was suffering from a psychotic state and was incapable of forming the requisite intent to kill. Therefore, a reasonable juror could conclude that Egyed's acts were not 'intentional' for coverage purposes, and this factual dispute should have been resolved by a jury, not by the judge on a summary judgment motion.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the legal distinction between the standard for intent in civil insurance contracts versus criminal law. By explicitly rejecting the 'irresistible impulse' or 'loss of volitional control' defense in this context, the court establishes a high bar for claimants seeking coverage for damages caused by an insured with a mental illness. The ruling reinforces the principle that as long as an insured understands the physical nature of their act and its probable consequences, the act is 'intentional' for exclusion purposes, regardless of the underlying psychological motivations. This makes it more difficult for estates or victims to recover from insurance policies in cases involving violence by an insured suffering from severe emotional or psychological distress.
