Malley et al. v. Briggs et al.
475 U.S. 335 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A police officer who causes an unconstitutional arrest by seeking a warrant based on an affidavit that a reasonably well-trained officer would have known failed to establish probable cause is not entitled to absolute immunity, but only qualified immunity, in a § 1983 damages action.
Facts:
- In December 1980, the Rhode Island State Police were conducting a court-authorized wiretap on the telephone of Paul Driscoll.
- Police intercepted a call from an individual identified as 'Dr. Shogun' who used terms like 'token' and 'passed it to Louisa,' which State Trooper Edward Malley interpreted as slang for smoking marijuana.
- Based on a second intercepted call, Trooper Malley concluded a party where these events occurred took place at the home of respondents, James and Louisa Briggs.
- Relying solely on his interpretation of these two calls, Malley drafted felony complaints and supporting affidavits alleging the Briggs had conspired to possess marijuana.
- Malley presented the complaints and affidavits to a State District Court Judge, who signed warrants for the arrest of the Briggs.
- The Briggs, prominent members of their community, were arrested at their home in the early morning, booked, held for several hours, and arraigned before being released.
- A grand jury subsequently declined to return an indictment against the Briggs, and all charges were dropped.
Procedural Posture:
- James and Louisa Briggs sued Trooper Edward Malley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island.
- At the close of the Briggs' evidence in a jury trial, Malley moved for a directed verdict.
- The District Court granted the directed verdict, holding that the judge's issuance of the warrant broke the causal chain and immunized Malley.
- The Briggs, as appellants, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, holding that an officer is entitled to immunity only if there was an objectively reasonable basis for believing the affidavit established probable cause.
- Malley, as petitioner, petitioned for and was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Is a police officer entitled to absolute immunity, rather than qualified immunity, from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for causing an unconstitutional arrest by presenting a judge with a complaint and affidavit that fail to establish probable cause?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No. A police officer whose request for a warrant allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest is entitled only to qualified immunity, governed by the same standard of objective reasonableness applied in suppression hearings under United States v. Leon. The court rejected absolute immunity because at common law in 1871, when § 1983 was enacted, a complaining witness did not have absolute immunity and could be liable for malicious prosecution. Furthermore, the function of an officer seeking a warrant is not analogous to that of a prosecutor seeking an indictment, a role 'intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process' that warrants absolute immunity. Qualified immunity provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law, and it appropriately encourages officers to reflect on whether their affidavit actually establishes probable cause. The act of a magistrate issuing a warrant does not break the causal chain or shield an officer who submits an application that no reasonably competent officer would have believed was valid.
Concurring in part and dissenting in part - Justice Powell
No. While the Court is correct that officers are entitled to qualified, not absolute, immunity, the majority's application of the standard is flawed. An officer's request for a warrant should be considered objectively reasonable if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether probable cause exists. The magistrate's independent judicial determination of probable cause should be accorded substantial evidentiary weight in this analysis. Here, the wiretap evidence, while perhaps marginal, was enough that a reasonably competent officer could have believed it constituted probable cause. Therefore, the officer should be found immune as a matter of law, and the case should not be remanded for a trial on the reasonableness of his conduct, as this creates an 'in terrorem' effect that will discourage police from seeking warrants.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies that a judge's sign-off on a warrant does not automatically absolve a police officer of liability for an unconstitutional arrest. By rejecting absolute immunity, the Court placed the initial burden of assessing probable cause on the officer, holding them to a professional standard of 'objective reasonableness.' The ruling creates a significant check on police power, providing a damages remedy for individuals arrested based on facially deficient warrant applications. This incentivizes more careful police work and discourages officers from submitting boilerplate or unsubstantiated affidavits to overworked magistrates, thereby strengthening Fourth Amendment protections.
