Maleng v. Cook
490 U.S. 488 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
A habeas petitioner is not 'in custody' under a conviction whose sentence has fully expired, even if that conviction was used to enhance a subsequent sentence. However, a petitioner is 'in custody' for a future state sentence, and may challenge it, if the state has lodged a detainer against them with the authorities currently holding them.
Facts:
- In 1958, Cook was convicted of robbery in a Washington state court and sentenced to 20 years.
- In 1976, while on parole, Cook was convicted in state court for two counts of assault and one count of aiding a prisoner to escape.
- Also in 1976, Cook was convicted in federal court for bank robbery and conspiracy and began serving a 30-year federal sentence in California.
- Cook's sentence for the 1958 robbery conviction fully expired in 1978.
- Following the expiration of his 1958 sentence, Washington sentenced Cook in 1978 for his 1976 state convictions to two life terms and one 10-year term.
- The 1958 conviction was used by Washington to increase the mandatory minimum term Cook must serve for his 1978 sentences.
- The State of Washington lodged a detainer with federal prison authorities, ensuring Cook will be transferred to Washington to begin serving his 1978 state sentences after his federal sentence ends.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1985, Cook filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging his 1958 state conviction.
- The District Court, a court of first instance, dismissed the petition for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding Cook was not 'in custody' for the expired 1958 conviction.
- Cook, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal, holding that Cook was 'in custody' because the 1958 conviction was used to enhance his yet-to-be-served 1978 sentences.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
Does a habeas petitioner remain 'in custody' for a conviction whose sentence has fully expired, solely because that conviction was used to enhance a subsequent sentence?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A habeas petitioner is not 'in custody' under a conviction for which the sentence has fully expired, as the collateral consequences of that conviction, such as the enhancement of a later sentence, are not themselves sufficient to establish custody. The Court reasoned that the statutory 'in custody' requirement would be read out of existence if a petitioner could challenge a conviction at any time merely because it might enhance a future sentence. However, while Cook is not in custody for the expired 1958 conviction, his habeas petition can be construed as a challenge to his 1978 state sentences. Based on the precedents of Peyton v. Rowe (allowing challenges to future, consecutive sentences) and Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court (holding a detainer constitutes custody), Cook is considered 'in custody' for his 1978 sentences because Washington has lodged a detainer against him with federal authorities. Therefore, federal courts have jurisdiction to hear his challenge to the 1978 sentences, including the enhancement based on the allegedly invalid 1958 conviction.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the limits of the 'in custody' requirement for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. It establishes a bright-line rule that a fully expired sentence cannot be the basis for a habeas challenge, rejecting the idea that lingering collateral consequences like sentence enhancement constitute custody. At the same time, the decision reinforces a broad interpretation of custody for future sentences by holding that a detainer is sufficient to place a prisoner 'in custody' for a sentence they have not yet begun to serve. This provides a clear procedural path for prisoners to challenge the use of prior, allegedly unconstitutional convictions in enhancing current or future sentences by attacking the new sentence rather than the expired one.
