Makepeace Bros. v. Town of Barnstable
198 N.E. 922, 1935 Mass. LEXIS 1285, 292 Mass. 518 (1935)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An easement created for a specific, limited purpose is extinguished when the purpose for which it was created becomes impossible to accomplish, such as when the industry it was intended to support ceases to exist.
Facts:
- In 1714-15, the Proprietors of the Town of Barnstable voted to divide common lands on a peninsula called Sandy Neck into individual lots.
- A vote on February 16, 1714-15 stated there shall be "Reserved a Priviledg of twenty Rods from High water mark... for the use of the Proprietors or inhabitants of this Towne... for the benifit of fisherie."
- A subsequent committee report on April 11, 1715, detailed the division scheme, reserving specific spots for setting up "Try houses" and other necessities for the "trying of cyl [oil]," a process specific to rendering whale blubber.
- The individual lots created by the division were described in the records as being bounded on the north "by the sea," which included the 20-rod strip within the private lot boundaries.
- The final record of the division specified the allowance of "two Try-Houses" and "Liberty of two Try-yards" within certain lots.
- In the centuries that followed, the local whaling industry in and around Barnstable ceased to exist entirely, making the use of try-yards for rendering whale oil obsolete.
Procedural Posture:
- The petitioner filed a petition in the Massachusetts Land Court to register title to a tract of land on Sandy Neck in Barnstable.
- The town of Barnstable, as a respondent, opposed the registration, claiming that the town held rights in a 20-rod strip of land along the shore based on colonial-era reservations.
- The Land Court found in favor of the petitioner, ruling that the reservations created an easement only for the whaling industry, which was extinguished when that industry disappeared.
- The Land Court ordered a decree for the registration of the land in the petitioner's name.
- The town of Barnstable appealed the decision of the Land Court to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a land reservation from a 1715 land division, which granted privileges for "fisherie" but was implemented with specific references to whaling infrastructure like "try-yards," create a permanent public easement for all fishing that continues to exist after the local whaling industry has disappeared?
Opinions:
Majority - Pierce, J.
No, the reservation created a limited easement specifically for the whaling industry, which was extinguished when that industry ceased to exist. The court reasoned that while an initial vote mentioned the general term "fisherie," the subsequent, more specific votes and implementation details exclusively referenced infrastructure for whaling, such as "try-yards" and the "trying of oil." Following the principle that old records should be interpreted in light of the circumstances at the time, the court concluded the proprietors' intent was to support the then-dominant whaling industry, not fishing in general. Citing precedent like Cornell-Andrews Smelting Co. v. Boston & Providence Railroad, the court affirmed that an easement stated for a particular purpose is limited to that purpose. Furthermore, under the rule from Central Wharf & Wet Dock Corp. v. Proprietors of India Wharf, when the purpose for which an easement is created becomes impossible to exercise, the easement is extinguished. Since the whaling industry had disappeared, the purpose of the easement could no longer be fulfilled, and the right was therefore extinguished.
Analysis:
This case provides a key illustration of how courts interpret the scope and duration of historical easements. It establishes that a general term in a grant, like "fishery," can be narrowed by more specific, contemporaneous language that reveals the parties' true, limited intent. The decision reinforces the legal doctrine of extinguishment, confirming that an easement's existence is tied to its purpose; if the purpose becomes permanently impossible, the property right itself terminates. This precedent is significant for resolving disputes over land rights tied to obsolete industries or technologies, providing a framework for clearing titles of antiquated encumbrances.
