Maine v. Moulton
474 U.S. 159 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated when the State knowingly exploits an opportunity to obtain incriminating statements from an accused about crimes for which they have already been indicted, without counsel present, even if the State is simultaneously and legitimately investigating other, uncharged crimes.
Facts:
- Police discovered evidence of several automobile-related thefts in a building leased by Perley Moulton and his co-defendant, Gary Colson.
- After being indicted for theft, Colson contacted the police, complaining of anonymous threats and expressing a desire to talk about the charges.
- Colson met with Moulton, who suggested the possibility of killing Gary Elwell, a State's witness in their upcoming trial.
- Colson confessed his and Moulton's involvement in the thefts to police and agreed to cooperate as an informant in exchange for a deal.
- Colson informed the police of Moulton's plan to kill the witness.
- At the police's suggestion, Colson recorded three telephone calls with Moulton, during which they agreed to meet on December 26 to plan their defense strategy for the pending theft charges.
- Police equipped Colson with a body wire transmitter for the December 26 meeting.
- During the meeting, Colson repeatedly feigned memory loss and asked Moulton to recount details of the thefts, eliciting numerous incriminating statements from Moulton regarding the crimes for which he was already indicted.
Procedural Posture:
- A grand jury in Waldo County, Maine, returned indictments charging Perley Moulton and Gary Colson with four counts of theft.
- Moulton and Colson pleaded not guilty in the Maine Superior Court.
- Moulton filed a pretrial motion to suppress recorded statements made to Colson, which the trial court denied.
- The State dismissed the original indictments and obtained seven new indictments against Moulton, which included the original charges plus new charges of burglary and arson.
- At a bench trial, the trial court found Moulton guilty of burglary and theft on three of the new indictments.
- Moulton appealed his convictions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, arguing the admission of his statements violated the Sixth Amendment.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine agreed with Moulton, reversed the convictions, and remanded for a new trial.
- The State of Maine successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel prohibit the admission of a defendant's post-indictment incriminating statements, deliberately elicited by a secret government informant, when the police were also investigating the defendant's alleged plot to commit a separate, uncharged crime?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused’s right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent. The Sixth Amendment imposes an affirmative obligation on the State not to circumvent the protections it affords the accused. Once the right to counsel has attached for a specific crime, any knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel is a breach of that obligation. Here, the police knew Moulton and Colson were meeting for the express purpose of discussing the pending charges and planning a defense. By wiring their informant, Colson, the police intentionally created a situation likely to induce Moulton to make incriminating statements about the indicted offenses. The State's legitimate interest in investigating a separate crime (the witness-tampering plot) does not justify infringing upon Moulton's Sixth Amendment right concerning the pending charges. Therefore, the resulting incriminating statements about the pending charges must be suppressed.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Burger
No. The Sixth Amendment is not violated when post-indictment statements are recorded as part of a good-faith investigation of entirely separate and new crimes. The police were not seeking to elicit information about the indicted theft charges; they were investigating a serious, ongoing crime—a plot to murder a witness—and ensuring their informant's safety. The statements regarding the theft charges were an incidental result of a legitimate and necessary investigation. The Sixth Amendment should not be transformed into a 'magic cloak' that immunizes habitual offenders who persist in criminal activity while under indictment. To exclude reliable evidence obtained during a lawful investigation into new crimes is a 'judicial aberration' that harms the truth-finding process and does not deter any actual police misconduct.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel established in Massiah v. United States. It establishes that the right is offense-specific, but that a legitimate, parallel investigation into new crimes does not excuse a deliberate elicitation of statements regarding crimes for which the right has already attached. The ruling forces law enforcement to segregate their investigations; evidence of new crimes obtained from an informant is admissible in a trial for those new crimes, but any incriminating statements about the already-pending charges are inadmissible at the trial for those charges. This creates a clear exclusionary rule for dual-purpose investigations, protecting the attorney-client relationship for indicted offenses while allowing police to continue investigating new criminal activity.
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