Mahrenholz v. County Board of School Trustees
417 N.E.2d 138, 93 Ill. App. 3d 366 (1981)
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Rule of Law:
A conveyance of land with language stating it is 'to be used for [a specific] purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein' creates a fee simple determinable, causing title to automatically revert to the grantor or their heirs upon the cessation of that specific use.
Facts:
- On March 18, 1941, W. E. and Jennie Hutton conveyed land to the Trustees of School District No. 1.
- The deed contained the clause: 'this land to be used for school purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein.'
- The Huttons died intestate, leaving their son, Harry E. Hutton, as their sole legal heir.
- On October 9, 1959, the Jacqmains conveyed a large tract of land to the plaintiffs, and this deed purported to also convey the future interest in the school property.
- The school district ceased holding classes on the property after May 30, 1973, and began using it for storage purposes.
- On May 7, 1977, Harry E. Hutton conveyed to the plaintiffs all of his interest in the school land.
- On September 6, 1977, Harry E. Hutton executed a document disclaiming and releasing his interest in the school property in favor of the school district.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiffs filed an initial complaint to quiet title in the circuit court of Lawrence County, which was amended and subsequently dismissed.
- The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, now based on the conveyance from Harry Hutton, which the trial court also dismissed.
- The plaintiffs then filed a third amended complaint, which recited their interests acquired from both the Jacqmains and Harry Hutton.
- On March 21, 1979, the trial court entered a final order dismissing the third amended complaint, ruling that the 1941 deed had created a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent.
- The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their third amended complaint to the Illinois Appellate Court.
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Issue:
Does a conveyance of land stating it is 'to be used for school purpose only; otherwise to revert to Grantors herein' create a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter, or a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent with a right of re-entry?
Opinions:
Majority - Jones, J.
Yes, this language creates a fee simple determinable with a possibility of reverter. The court reasoned that the phrase 'for school purpose only' acts as a limitation within the granting clause itself, suggesting a limited grant intended to last only as long as the specified purpose continued. This is distinct from language creating a condition subsequent, such as 'upon condition that,' which appends a condition to an otherwise absolute grant. The court found that the Huttons intended to give the property to the school district only as long as it was needed for that purpose, creating a fee simple determinable. Consequently, upon the cessation of use for school purposes, title automatically reverted by operation of law to the grantors' heir, Harry Hutton, who then possessed a fee simple absolute interest that he could legally convey to the plaintiffs.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the critical distinction between a fee simple determinable and a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent in Illinois property law. The court's focus on the placement and phrasing of limiting words like 'only' establishes a key interpretive guide for future cases involving defeasible estates. The decision reinforces that a fee simple determinable results in an automatic forfeiture of title upon the breach of the condition, which can have significant consequences for land ownership and title clarity without any action required by the holder of the future interest.
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