Mahnke v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121363, 821 F.Supp.2d 125, 86 Fed. R. Serv. 1162 (2011)
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Rule of Law:
Under District of Columbia law, a defendant's violation of a traffic regulation may constitute negligence per se, but it does not preclude the defendant from asserting a contributory negligence defense. The last clear chance doctrine may still allow a contributorily negligent plaintiff to recover if the defendant had a superior opportunity to avoid the accident.
Facts:
- On September 3, 2009, Amanda Mahnke was standing at the corner of an intersection in Washington, D.C., waiting to cross the street.
- Another pedestrian, Gabriela Salazar, was standing to Mahnke's left.
- A WMATA bus, driven by employee Carla Proctor, approached the intersection as the traffic light turned from green to yellow, and Proctor accelerated in an attempt to clear the intersection.
- The bus was allegedly traveling over the 25 mph speed limit, with estimates ranging from 26 to 30 mph.
- When the pedestrian 'walk' signal illuminated, both Mahnke and Salazar entered the crosswalk.
- Salazar noticed the approaching bus and immediately stepped back onto the curb.
- Mahnke did not see the bus and was struck after she stepped into the crosswalk.
- Mahnke suffered numerous serious injuries, including a fractured skull and traumatic brain injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Amanda Mahnke filed a Complaint against WMATA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging negligence.
- Mahnke voluntarily dismissed her claims for negligent hiring/supervision and gross negligence.
- Following discovery, WMATA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Mahnke's contributory negligence barred her recovery.
- Mahnke filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude WMATA from raising a contributory negligence defense at trial.
- The parties also filed eleven additional motions in limine concerning various evidentiary matters to be decided before trial.
- The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia considered these pending motions.
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Issue:
Under District of Columbia law, does a defendant's violation of a traffic regulation, which may constitute negligence per se, bar the defendant from raising a contributory negligence defense?
Opinions:
Majority - Howell, Beryl A.
No. A defendant's violation of a traffic regulation does not bar a contributory negligence defense because such regulations serve to define the standard of due care for all parties, not to place the entire responsibility for harm on the defendant. The court explained that defenses like contributory negligence are only barred when they conflict with the purpose of a specific statute or regulation. Some regulations, like workplace safety laws, are designed to protect a specific class of people from their own carelessness, and allowing a contributory negligence defense would undermine that purpose. However, traffic regulations are different; they aim to clarify the elements of due care for all users of the roadway, including both drivers and pedestrians. The court cited D.C. precedent, specifically Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co. and Massengale v. Pitts, to support the conclusion that since traffic regulations do not shift the entire burden of safety to one party, the defense of contributory negligence remains available. Therefore, WMATA is permitted to argue at trial that Mahnke's own negligence contributed to her injuries.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces a critical distinction in District of Columbia tort law regarding the effect of negligence per se. It clarifies that not all statutory violations are treated equally; the availability of a contributory negligence defense depends on the underlying purpose of the violated regulation. By holding that traffic laws merely define a standard of care rather than imposing absolute liability, the court preserves traditional tort defenses in traffic accident cases. This approach ensures that juries can consider the fault of all parties, which is particularly significant in a contributory negligence jurisdiction where any fault on the plaintiff's part can bar recovery entirely, subject only to doctrines like the last clear chance.
