No. The school went too far by punishing her. While schools can sometimes discipline students for serious off-campus behavior like online bullying or threats, their power is limited. The Court gave three main reasons: 1) The school isn't your parent when you're not at school. 2) If schools controlled what you say 24/7, you'd have no free speech. 3) Schools should teach democracy, and that means protecting speech, even when it's unpopular or uses curse words. B.L.'s post was just her venting on her own time and didn't cause a big enough problem at school to justify the punishment.

No. He agreed with the result but put it this way: parents let schools make rules for school stuff, but they don't give them power to control a kid's entire life. B.L.'s post was her own business, not the school's. Since she wasn't at a school activity, the school shouldn't have punished her for blowing off steam.

Yes. The school was right to punish her. This judge said that historically, schools have always had the power to discipline students for off-campus actions that directly harm the school. He believed B.L.'s post was meant to hurt the cheer team and disrespect the coach, which gives the school the right to step in. He thinks the Court's decision ignores this long history.

The school was wrong to punish B. L. for her Snapchat posts because they were made outside of school and didn't cause a big disruption at school. Even though what B. L. said was rude, the school can't punish her for expressing herself off campus, on her own time. The fact that a few students talked about the posts for a couple minutes in one class doesn't count as a big disruption. The school also didn't show that the posts interfered with the cheerleading team in a big way.

Agrees with the final decision but warns that schools should be careful about punishing students for things they say off campus, especially about political or social issues. Points out that the majority didn't consider that schools might actually have more power to punish students for social media posts because those can easily spread to the school, even if they're made off campus. Also says the majority just assumed the posts were off-campus without really analyzing that issue.

Disagrees with the majority, arguing that they ignored the historical rule that schools could punish students for speech outside of school if it would foreseeably disrupt the school. Thinks B. L.'s posts did undermine the coach's authority, so the school could punish her under the old rule. Says the majority abandoned this rule without a good reason.

We say the school was wrong to punish B. L. for her Snapchat posts because they were made outside of school and didn't cause a big disruption at school. Even though what B. L. said was rude, the school can't punish her for expressing herself off campus, on her own time. The fact that a few students talked about the posts for a couple minutes in one class doesn't count as a big disruption. The school also didn't show that the posts interfered with the cheerleading team in a big way.

I concur with the final decision but warn that schools should be careful about punishing students for things they say off campus, especially about political or social issues. I point out that the majority didn't consider that schools might actually have more power to punish students for social media posts because those can easily spread to the school, even if they're made off campus. I also note that the majority just assumed the posts were off campus without really analyzing that issue.

I dissent because the majority ignores the historical rule that schools could punish students for speech outside of school if it would foreseeably disrupt the school. B. L.'s posts did undermine the coach's authority, so the school could punish her under the old rule. The majority abandons this rule without a good reason.

Yes. The school's suspension of B.L. from the cheerleading squad for her off-campus speech violated her First Amendment rights. The Court rejected the Third Circuit's bright-line rule that schools can never regulate off-campus speech, acknowledging that interests like preventing severe bullying, threats, or breaches of school security could justify regulation. However, the Court identified three features that diminish a school's authority over off-campus speech: 1) a school will rarely stand in loco parentis in relation to off-campus speech; 2) regulating off-campus speech risks policing all of a student's expression 24 hours a day; and 3) the school has an interest in protecting even unpopular student expression as a 'nursery of democracy.' In B.L.'s case, her speech occurred off-campus on her own time using a personal device. The school's interests in teaching good manners and preventing disruption were insufficient to overcome her free expression rights, as the actual disruption—a few minutes of discussion in one class—did not meet the 'substantial disruption' standard set by Tinker v. Des Moines.

Yes. Justice Alito agreed with the majority's conclusion but wrote separately to provide a clearer framework based on the doctrine of in loco parentis. He argued that a school's authority derives from the implied consent of parents, which is broad for on-campus, school-related activities but very limited for off-campus conduct. He categorized off-campus speech into three types: speech during extensions of the school program (regulatable), speech on matters of public concern (highly protected), and a difficult middle category including threats and bullying. B.L.'s speech was simple, crude criticism of a school program, not directed at any individual in a threatening or harassing manner, and therefore the school lacked the delegated parental authority to punish it.

No. The school's disciplinary action did not violate the First Amendment. The majority's decision is untethered from the historical understanding of a school's authority. Historically, schools could discipline students for off-campus speech that had a 'proximate tendency to harm the school environment.' Under this historical test, B.L.'s speech, which was intended to degrade the cheerleading program and its coaches in front of other students, had a direct and immediate tendency to subvert the coach's authority. Therefore, the school acted within its traditional disciplinary powers, and the punishment should have been upheld.

Yes. The school violated B. L.'s First Amendment rights when it suspended her from the junior varsity cheerleading squad because her Snapchat posts, while crude, did not cause substantial disruption at the school. The school's regulatory interests in teaching good manners and punishing vulgar language aimed at the school community are weakened considerably by the fact that B. L. spoke outside the school on her own time. The school's interest in preventing disruption is not supported by the record, which shows that discussion of the matter took, at most, 5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class "for just a couple of days." This alone does not satisfy Tinker's demanding standards. Likewise, there is little to suggest a substantial interference in, or disruption of, the school's efforts to maintain cohesion on the cheerleading squad.

Concurs with the judgment, emphasizing the need for caution when regulating off-campus speech and the importance of protecting students' free expression on matters of public concern. Alito notes that the majority fails to consider whether schools often will have more authority, not less, to discipline students who transmit speech through social media because off-campus speech made through social media can be received on campus and spread rapidly. He also points out that the majority uncritically adopts the assumption that B. L.'s speech was off campus, when the location of speech originating off campus but received on campus is a trickier question.

Dissents, arguing that the majority fails to consider the historical rule that schools could discipline students for off-campus speech that had a proximate tendency to harm the school environment. Thomas argues that B. L.'s speech had a direct and immediate tendency to subvert the cheerleading coach's authority, so the coach had authority to discipline her under the historical rule. He criticizes the majority for abandoning this historical approach in favor of a new rule untethered from anything stable.

No. We hold that the school violated B. L.'s First Amendment rights when it suspended her from the junior varsity cheerleading squad because her Snapchat posts, while crude, did not cause substantial disruption at the school. The regulatory interests in teaching good manners and punishing vulgar language aimed at the school community are weakened considerably by the fact that B. L. spoke outside the school on her own time. The interest in preventing disruption is not supported by the record, which shows that discussion of the matter took, at most, 5 to 10 minutes of an Algebra class “for just a couple of days.” This alone does not satisfy Tinker’s demanding standards. Likewise, there is little to suggest a substantial interference in, or disruption of, the school’s efforts to maintain cohesion on the cheerleading squad.

I concur with the judgment, emphasizing the need for caution when regulating off-campus speech and the importance of protecting students' free expression on matters of public concern. I note that the majority fails to consider whether schools often will have more authority, not less, to discipline students who transmit speech through social media because off-campus speech made through social media can be received on campus and spread rapidly. I also point out that the majority uncritically adopts the assumption that B. L.'s speech was off campus, when the location of speech originating off campus but received on campus is a trickier question.

I respectfully dissent. The majority fails to consider the historical rule that schools could discipline students for off-campus speech that had a proximate tendency to harm the school environment. B. L.'s speech had a direct and immediate tendency to subvert the cheerleading coach's authority, so the coach had authority to discipline her under that historical rule. The majority abandons this historical approach in favor of a new rule untethered from anything stable.

Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B. L.

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