Magwood v. Patterson
561 U.S. 320, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5258, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010)
Rule of Law:
A federal habeas corpus application filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a new state-court judgment imposed after a prior successful habeas petition is not 'second or successive' under § 2244(b), regardless of whether the specific claims raised could have been challenged in the initial petition.
Facts:
- Billy Joe Magwood served time in the Coffee County Jail in Alabama for a drug offense under the supervision of Sheriff C.F. 'Neil' Grantham.
- During his imprisonment, Magwood became convinced that Sheriff Grantham had incarcerated him without cause and vowed to take revenge upon his release.
- On the morning of March 1, 1979, shortly after being released from jail, Magwood drove to the jail and parked outside to await the Sheriff's arrival.
- When Sheriff Grantham exited his vehicle, Magwood shot and killed him.
- Magwood then fled the scene of the shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- Magwood was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in Alabama state trial court.
- The conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court.
- Magwood filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama challenging his conviction and sentence.
- The District Court upheld the conviction but vacated the death sentence and conditionally granted the writ; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
- The state trial court held a new sentencing hearing and again imposed the death penalty.
- The new sentence was affirmed by the Alabama state appellate courts.
- Magwood filed a second federal habeas petition in the U.S. District Court challenging the new death sentence.
- The District Court granted the writ, finding the new sentence unconstitutional.
- The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling the petition was 'second or successive' and thus barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
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Issue:
Is a federal habeas corpus application challenging a new sentence imposed after a resentencing judgment 'second or successive' under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) when the petitioner asserts a claim that was available but not raised during his challenge to the original sentence?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Thomas
No, the Court held that because the petitioner's habeas application challenges a new judgment for the first time, it is not 'second or successive' under the statute. The Court reasoned that the text of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) applies to 'applications' rather than individual 'claims,' and that habeas relief is sought against a specific judgment authorizing confinement. When the state court held a new sentencing proceeding and issued a new sentence, it created a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions. The Court determined that an error made a second time in a new judgment is a 'new error' for legal purposes. Consequently, the abuse-of-the-writ principles relied upon by the state do not replace the statutory text, which permits a first challenge to a new judgment to proceed without the restrictions imposed on successive petitions.
Dissent - Justice Kennedy
Yes, the dissent argued that the petition should be considered 'second or successive' because the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to raise the claim in his first federal petition but failed to do so. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the phrase 'second or successive' is a term of art that incorporates pre-AEDPA abuse-of-the-writ doctrines. Under these doctrines, raising a claim that was available during the first petition constitutes an abuse of the writ. The dissent criticized the majority for creating a loophole that allows a petitioner to re-litigate old, previously abandoned claims against his underlying conviction simply because he achieved a minor victory regarding his sentence, undermining AEDPA's purpose of comity and finality.
Concurrence - Justice Breyer
No, the concurrence agreed with the majority but wrote separately to clarify that this decision is consistent with the Court's prior ruling in Panetti v. Quarterman. Justice Breyer distinguished Panetti—which dealt with a second petition against the same judgment—from the current case, which involves a first petition against a new judgment. He emphasized that because there is a new judgment which has never been challenged in federal court, the petition cannot logically be considered 'second or successive.'
Analysis:
This decision significantly interprets the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) by adhering to a strict textual understanding of 'judgment.' It essentially provides a 'reset button' for federal habeas review when a prisoner succeeds in getting a resentencing, even if the underlying conviction remains untouched. By defining the application's status based on the existence of a new judgment rather than the availability of the claim previously, the Court allows petitioners to raise arguments in a 'first' petition against a new sentence that they may have procedurally neglected in their original attempts. This ruling limits the application of the 'second or successive' bar, potentially increasing federal review of state sentences where a resentencing has occurred.
