Magnuson Ex Rel. Mabe v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.
844 S.W.2d 448, 1992 Mo. App. LEXIS 1640 (1992)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A plaintiff retains the right to select which tortfeasors to sue, and a co-defendant lacks standing to object to the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of another defendant if the co-defendant failed to file a cross-claim or third-party claim. A trial court's order for a new trial based on the dismissal of a party is rendered moot if the plaintiff subsequently dismisses that party from the case with finality.
Facts:
- A wheel and tire assembly broke loose from a moving Dodge pick-up truck.
- The detached wheel struck four-and-a-half-year-old Eric Magnuson in the head.
- Magnuson suffered severe and permanent injuries, including a contre-coup brain injury, hemiparesis, cognitive impairment, and memory loss.
- The wheel was co-designed by Kelsey-Hayes Company and Chrysler Motors Corporation.
- Kelsey-Hayes Canada, Ltd. manufactured the wheel under the direction of Kelsey-Hayes Company.
- An expert metallurgist testified that the steel used to form the wheel had a defective microstructure and was improperly thinned during manufacturing, making it brittle and prone to fracture.
Procedural Posture:
- Eric Magnuson sued Kelsey-Hayes Company, Chrysler Motors Corporation, and Raytown Dodge in trial court.
- The trial court granted Raytown Dodge's motion for dismissal.
- Magnuson filed a first amended petition adding Kelsey-Hayes Canada, Ltd. as a defendant.
- The trial court granted Chrysler's motion to dismiss without prejudice.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial against Kelsey-Hayes and Kelsey-Hayes Canada.
- The jury returned a verdict for Magnuson, awarding him $4,750,000.
- Kelsey-Hayes and Kelsey-Hayes Canada filed post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), a new trial, and remittitur.
- The trial court denied the JNOV motion but granted the motion for a new trial, reasoning that it had erred in dismissing Chrysler.
- Magnuson, the appellant, appealed the order for a new trial to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Can a trial court's order granting a new trial, based on its finding that it improperly dismissed one defendant, be sustained when the plaintiff subsequently voluntarily and permanently dismisses that same defendant from the case, thereby rendering the basis for the new trial order moot?
Opinions:
Majority - Breckenridge, Judge.
No. The trial court's order for a new trial is reversed because its sole basis was rendered moot by the plaintiff's subsequent actions. A plaintiff is the master of his claim and has the right to pursue and collect from any tortfeasor of his choosing. Magnuson’s voluntary dismissal of Chrysler, with Chrysler's consent, after the appeal was filed, terminated the cause of action against Chrysler and mooted the trial court's specific reason for granting a new trial. The Kelsey-Hayes defendants lacked standing to object to Chrysler's dismissal because they never availed themselves of the opportunity to file a cross-claim or third-party petition to apportion fault. Furthermore, Magnuson made a submissible case on his strict liability manufacturing defect theory through expert testimony, which was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the fundamental principle of plaintiff autonomy in tort litigation, affirming that a plaintiff is the master of the complaint. It clarifies that defendants seeking to apportion fault to other parties must take affirmative procedural steps, such as filing cross-claims or third-party petitions, and cannot rely on the plaintiff's choice of defendants or later complain about their absence. The case also demonstrates how a post-judgment procedural maneuver, like a voluntary dismissal on appeal, can effectively nullify the entire basis for a trial court's ruling. Lastly, it affirms that under Missouri law, proving a manufacturing defect does not strictly require evidence that the product deviated from its design specifications; showing it was in a dangerously defective condition when it entered commerce is sufficient.
Unlock the full brief for Magnuson Ex Rel. Mabe v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.