Madsen v. East Jordan Irr. Co.
101 Utah 552, 1942 Utah LEXIS 24, 125 P.2d 794 (1942)
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Rule of Law:
A party engaged in an ultrahazardous activity like blasting is not subject to strict liability for damages that arise indirectly from the unforeseeable, intervening act of an animal reacting to the activity's stimuli.
Facts:
- Appellant Madsen Mink Farm used its property to breed and raise mink for sale.
- The farm was located 100 yards from an irrigation canal owned by the respondent.
- On May 5, 1941, the respondent used explosives to blast while making repairs to its canal.
- The blasting produced vibrations and noises.
- The noises and vibrations frightened mother minks on the appellant's farm.
- As a result of their fright, 108 mother minks killed 230 of their young ("kittens").
- Minks, by nature, are highly excitable when attending to their young and have a disposition to kill them when terrified or disturbed.
Procedural Posture:
- The appellant, Madsen Mink Farm, filed an amended complaint against the respondent in the trial court.
- The respondent filed a general demurrer to the amended complaint, arguing it failed to state a valid cause of action.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer and gave the appellant five days to amend its complaint.
- The appellant failed to amend the complaint.
- The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the respondent.
- The appellant appealed the trial court's judgment to this court.
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Issue:
Does a party who uses explosives become strictly liable for damages caused when the resulting vibrations and noise frighten a mother mink, causing it to kill its own young?
Opinions:
Majority - Pratt, Justice
No. Strict liability for blasting does not extend to harm that is not a direct physical result of the explosion but is instead caused by the peculiar, intervening act of an animal. The results chargeable to a non-negligent user of explosives are those ordinarily resulting from an explosion, such as shock, air vibrations, and thrown missiles. The killing of young by a mother mink is not a direct physical result but a 'peculiarity of disposition' that is not within the realm of matters to be anticipated from an explosion. Unlike the famous Squib case, where the human reaction was an instinctive act of self-preservation, the minks' action was not. Therefore, without an allegation of negligence, the harm is too remote to support a cause of action based on strict liability.
Concurring - Wolfe, Justice
No. The harm alleged constitutes an action in 'case,' which requires proof of negligence, rather than an action in 'trespass,' which allows for strict liability. While direct injury from projected matter or possibly even concussion constitutes trespass, harm caused through the non-automatic mental reaction of an animal is indirect. The mother minks' reaction was not a purely automatic reflex, like in the Squib case, but an act in response to stimuli. Because the injury resulted from this intervening, non-automatic act, the cause of action lies in case, and negligence must be alleged and proved before considering whether the harm was foreseeable within the 'range of apprehension.'
Analysis:
This decision limits the scope of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities by introducing a foreseeability component for indirect harm. The court establishes that while direct physical damages from such activities do not require proof of negligence, indirect damages resulting from an intervening, peculiar act of an animal do. This ruling solidifies the distinction between direct consequences, which fall under strict liability, and indirect, unforeseeable consequences, which must be pursued under a negligence theory. It prevents the expansion of strict liability to cover a potentially limitless chain of causation involving unusual animal behavior.
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