Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc.
1991 Ore. LEXIS 73, 312 Or. 198, 818 P.2d 930 (1991)
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Rule of Law:
A wrongful discharge claim under the public duty exception requires the plaintiff to specifically identify the public duty or relevant criminal laws in the complaint. A claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress requires that the defendant's acts, not merely the employer's motive for termination, constituted an extraordinary transgression of socially tolerable conduct, and the distress must be caused by these acts, not solely by the termination itself.
Facts:
- Plaintiff was employed as a salesperson by defendant Kendall Ford, Inc., and defendant Dan David was his supervisor.
- Defendants instructed plaintiff to pull down his pants and expose his buttocks, testicles, and penis to Dan David and others, including fellow employees, children, women, and customers, while plaintiff was on duty at work in a public place.
- Plaintiff refused to comply with the instruction.
- Defendants repeated the instruction twice more, and plaintiff again refused.
- On or about October 22, 1986, defendants terminated plaintiff as a result of his refusal to obey the instructions.
- Plaintiff alleged suffering mental pain and suffering, depression, anxiety, lost wages, loss of self-esteem, embarrassment, and needing psychiatric treatment due to his termination.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress against defendants Kendall Ford, Inc. and Dan David.
- Defendants moved to dismiss both tort claims in the circuit court (trial court) for failure to state ultimate facts sufficient to constitute a claim under ORCP 21A(8).
- The trial court granted the defendants' motion and entered judgment for defendants, dismissing both tort claims.
- Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of both claims to the Oregon Court of Appeals (appellant: plaintiff, appellee: defendants).
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim but reversed the dismissal of the claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress.
- Plaintiff petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court for review on the wrongful discharge claim, and defendants petitioned for review on the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress claim.
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Issue:
1. Does an employee adequately plead a wrongful discharge claim under the public duty exception by asserting that termination resulted from refusing to commit a criminal act, without specifically identifying the public duty or relevant criminal laws in the complaint? 2. Does a complaint for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress adequately state a claim when it alleges that the reason for termination was outrageous and caused distress, but does not allege that the manner of termination or other preceding acts caused the distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Graber, J.
1. No, an employee does not adequately plead a wrongful discharge claim under the public duty exception without specifically identifying the public duty or relevant criminal laws in the complaint. The court affirmed the dismissal of the wrongful discharge claim, citing Sheets v. Knight, which requires a plaintiff relying on the public duty theory to "at least identify in the complaint the public duty on which the plaintiff relies." Plaintiff's argument that the relevant public duty was to avoid committing a crime appeared for the first time in his appellate arguments, not in his amended complaint. 2. No, a complaint for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress does not adequately state a claim when it alleges that the reason for termination was outrageous and caused distress, but does not allege that the manner of termination or other preceding acts caused the distress. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, clarifying that this tort, as outlined in Sheets v. Knight, requires pleading that "(1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the plaintiff, (2) the defendant’s acts were the cause of the plaintiff’s severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant’s acts constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct." The court, referencing Patton v. J. C. Penney Co., emphasized that the focus is on the "act" and "means" of inflicting injury, not merely the employer's "motive" for firing. The mere act of firing an employee, even if wrongfully motivated, does not, without more, constitute an extraordinary transgression of socially tolerable behavior. The plaintiff's complaint explicitly alleged that distress was caused only "as a result of his wrongful termination" and not by the underlying events or the manner of the firing.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies pleading requirements for wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, particularly in employment contexts. It reinforces that a plaintiff relying on a public duty exception for wrongful discharge must be specific about the duty in the complaint, underscoring the importance of proper legal articulation. For intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, the court draws a critical distinction between the employer's motive for termination and the actual acts or manner of termination. This distinction prevents the tort from being broadly applied to any discharge based on an objectionable reason, ensuring it remains focused on genuinely outrageous conduct that directly causes severe emotional distress, not just the emotional fallout from being fired. Future litigants must ensure their complaints precisely allege the specific public duty and the nature of the 'extraordinary transgression' causing distress, independent of the termination itself.
