Yes, you can sue the car company. The old rule that you can only sue the person you have a direct contract with is outdated. When a company makes something like a car, which is very dangerous if built wrong, they should know that a mistake could hurt the person who ends up driving it. Because this danger is easy to predict, the company has a legal duty to be careful for the safety of the final user. Buick was responsible for the whole car, so they should have tested all its parts, including the wheels they bought from someone else.

No, you shouldn't be able to sue the car company. The law has always been that you can only sue the company you bought something from directly. The only exception is for things that are 'inherently dangerous,' like poison. A car isn't like poison; it's not dangerous by itself. The court is making up a new rule that expands who a company is responsible for, and that's a job for lawmakers, not judges. We should stick with the old, established rule.

Yes, Buick had a duty to be careful for MacPherson's safety. A car can be dangerous if it's not made right. Buick knew this and knew that people other than the buyer would use the car. This means they have to be extra careful. It doesn't matter that they didn't make the wheel themselves - they're responsible for the whole car. They have this duty because it's the law, not just because of any deals they made. As new inventions come around, companies have to be careful in new ways. If something is likely to seriously hurt people if it's made wrong, it's a dangerous thing. Because the danger can be expected, the company has to try to prevent harm. This rule isn't just about poisons and explosives anymore. What matters is whether the danger could be predicted. The company needs to know the danger is probable, not just possible. They also need to know that others besides the buyer will probably face the danger. Courts can often tell this from the type of product. The closeness of the relationship matters too. Here, we're talking about a company that makes a product and puts it out there to be used without being checked first. If they're careless when danger is expected, they're responsible. They don't have to predict the exact person, but they have to worry about the group of people who will probably use the product in the normal way. The judgment against Buick should stand.

The majority is making the law cover more than it ever has before. The rule has always been that a seller is only responsible to the person who directly bought the product, unless the product is naturally dangerous. A regular car isn't naturally dangerous. The bad wheel on this car going slowly wasn't more dangerous than a bad wheel on a horse carriage. The law wouldn't make the carriage maker pay for a stranger's injuries. The majority wants to change that. If we're going to change the law, that's a job for the lawmakers, not the courts. The judgment against Buick should be erased.

Yes, a company that makes a product is responsible if someone gets hurt by it because it was made poorly, even if the person didn't buy it directly from the company. Buick had a duty to be careful for MacPherson's safety. A car can be dangerous if it's not made right. Buick knew this and knew that people other than the buyer would use the car. This means they have to be extra careful. It doesn't matter that they didn't make the wheel themselves—they're responsible for the whole car. They have this duty because it's the law, not just because of any deals they made. As new inventions come around, companies have to be careful in new ways. If something is likely to seriously hurt people if it's made wrong, it's a dangerous thing. Because the danger can be expected, the company has to try to prevent harm. This rule isn't just about poisons and explosives anymore. What matters is whether the danger could be predicted. The company needs to know the danger is probable, not just possible. They also need to know that others besides the buyer will probably face the danger. Courts can often tell this from the type of product. The closeness of the relationship matters too. Here, we're talking about a company that makes a product and puts it out there to be used without being checked first. If they're careless when danger is expected, they're responsible. They don't have to predict the exact person, but they have to worry about the group of people who will probably use the product in the normal way. The judgment against Buick should stand.

No, a company that makes a product is not responsible if someone gets hurt by it because it was made poorly, when the person didn't buy it directly from the company, unless the product is naturally dangerous. The majority is making the law cover more than it ever has before. The rule has always been that a seller is only responsible to the person who directly bought the product, unless the product is naturally dangerous. A regular car isn't naturally dangerous. The bad wheel on this car going slowly wasn't more dangerous than a bad wheel on a horse carriage. The law wouldn't make the carriage maker pay for a stranger's injuries. The majority wants to change that. If we're going to change the law, that's a job for the lawmakers, not the courts. The judgment against Buick should be erased.

Yes, a manufacturer owes a duty of care to the ultimate consumer under these circumstances. The legal principle that a manufacturer's duty is limited to its immediate contractual partner is an outdated rule that does not apply to products that are inherently dangerous if made negligently. The category of dangerous items is not limited to things like poison and explosives; it includes any product whose nature is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made. Because the danger of a defective automobile is foreseeable to parties beyond the immediate purchaser, the manufacturer has a duty, rooted in law rather than contract, to inspect the finished product for defects. Buick, as the manufacturer of the finished car, was responsible for the final product and could not abdicate its duty to inspect component parts, especially when it was foreseeable that the car would be used by others and that a defect could lead to serious injury.

No, a manufacturer's liability for negligence is confined to the immediate vendee and does not extend to strangers to the contract. The established rule, derived from cases like *Winterbottom v. Wright*, limits liability to those in privity of contract, with a narrow exception for articles that are inherently dangerous, such as poisons or explosives. An automobile is not an inherently dangerous vehicle, as the trial court itself instructed. To hold the manufacturer liable to a subvendee is to overrule a long line of precedent and radically expand liability. Such a significant change in the law should be made by the legislature, not the judiciary. The majority's decision wrongly departs from the settled doctrine that has been consistently applied by courts in New York and other jurisdictions.

Yes, Buick owed a duty of care to MacPherson. The nature of an automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective. Buick knew the danger and knew that the car would be used by persons other than the buyer in the manner that it was being used. This knowledge, combined with the foreseeability of harm to others, creates a duty of vigilance. It does not matter that the component part was made by another manufacturer - Buick is responsible for the finished product and has a duty to inspect the component parts. The duty arises not from contract but from the law. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but things subject to the principle may change with developing civilization. Subtle distinctions between things inherently or imminently dangerous are not controlling. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury. The principle from Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature. The question always is whether the danger is to be foreseen. There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. There must also be knowledge that the danger will be shared by others than the buyer in the ordinary course of events. Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the transaction. The proximity or remoteness of the relation is a factor to be considered. We are dealing with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by his customers. If he is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, a liability will follow. We do not say that Buick was required to foresee injury to a particular user, but it was required to foresee injury to any member of the class of persons who would probably use the car in the manner in which it was being used. The judgment should be affirmed.

The majority opinion extends the liability of the vendor of a manufactured article further than any previous case. The established rule is that the liability of a vendor for negligence does not extend to strangers injured by defects, but is confined to the immediate purchaser, with limited exceptions for articles that are inherently dangerous. An ordinary automobile is not an inherently dangerous article. The defective wheel on this car moving at only eight miles per hour was not any more dangerous than a similarly defective wheel on a horse-drawn carriage. Unless the courts have been wrong up to now, there would be no liability to strangers in the case of the carriage. The majority view would overturn the well-settled rule. If the law is to be changed, it should be done by the legislature, not the courts. The judgment should be reversed.

Yes, a manufacturer owes a duty of care to a third party who is not in privity of contract when the product, if negligently made, is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril. The nature of an automobile gives warning of probable danger if its construction is defective. Buick knew the danger and knew that the car would be used by persons other than the buyer in the manner that it was being used. This knowledge, combined with the foreseeability of harm to others, creates a duty of vigilance. It does not matter that the component part was made by another manufacturer—Buick is responsible for the finished product and has a duty to inspect the component parts. The duty arises not from contract but from the law. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but things subject to the principle may change with developing civilization. Subtle distinctions between things inherently or imminently dangerous are not controlling. If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Because the danger is to be foreseen, there is a duty to avoid the injury. The principle from Thomas v. Winchester is not limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature. The question always is whether the danger is to be foreseen. There must be knowledge of a danger, not merely possible, but probable. There must also be knowledge that the danger will be shared by others than the buyer in the ordinary course of events. Such knowledge may often be inferred from the nature of the transaction. The proximity or remoteness of the relation is a factor to be considered. We are dealing with the liability of the manufacturer of the finished product, who puts it on the market to be used without inspection by customers. If the manufacturer is negligent, where danger is to be foreseen, liability will follow. We do not say that Buick was required to foresee injury to a particular user, but it was required to foresee injury to any member of the class of persons who would probably use the car in the manner in which it was being used. The judgment should be affirmed.

No, a manufacturer does not owe a duty of care to a third party who is not in privity of contract when the product, even if negligently made, is not inherently dangerous. Extending the liability of the vendor of a manufactured article further than any previous case is unwarranted. The established rule is that the liability of a vendor for negligence does not extend to strangers injured by defects but is confined to the immediate purchaser, with limited exceptions for articles that are inherently dangerous. An ordinary automobile is not an inherently dangerous article. The defective wheel on this car moving at only eight miles per hour was not any more dangerous than a similarly defective wheel on a horse-drawn carriage. Unless courts have been wrong up to now, there would be no liability to strangers in the case of the carriage. The majority view overturns the well-settled rule. If the law is to be changed, it should be done by the legislature, not the courts. The judgment should be reversed.

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.

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