MacKey v. Montrym
61 L. Ed. 2d 321, 1979 U.S. LEXIS 8, 443 U.S. 1 (1979)
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Rule of Law:
A state statute that mandates the summary suspension of a driver's license upon a driver's refusal to submit to a breath-analysis test, without a pre-suspension evidentiary hearing, does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided a prompt post-suspension hearing is available.
Facts:
- On May 15, 1976, Donald Montrym was involved in a motor vehicle collision in Acton, Massachusetts.
- An arriving police officer observed that Montrym was 'glassy eyed,' unsteady, slurring his speech, and smelled strongly of alcohol.
- The officer arrested Montrym for operating a vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
- At the police station, Montrym was asked to take a breath-analysis test, and he refused.
- Approximately 20 minutes later, after speaking with his lawyer, Montrym attempted to retract his refusal and requested to take the test.
- The police declined to administer the test, stating that the law required them to immediately prepare a written report of his refusal.
- The officer completed a sworn report of Montrym's refusal, which was sent to the Massachusetts Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
- Upon receipt of the report, the Registrar formally suspended Montrym's driver's license for 90 days.
Procedural Posture:
- Donald Montrym filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.
- The complaint alleged the Massachusetts implied consent statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and sought injunctive and declaratory relief.
- A single District Judge issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the suspension of Montrym's license.
- A three-judge District Court was convened, which granted partial summary judgment for Montrym.
- The District Court declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause, permanently enjoined its enforcement, and certified a plaintiff class.
- The Registrar (appellant) filed a direct appeal of the District Court's judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a state statute that mandates the immediate suspension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a breath-analysis test, without providing a pre-suspension hearing, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
No. The Massachusetts statute authorizing summary suspension of a driver's license for refusal to take a breath-analysis test does not violate the Due Process Clause. The court applied the three-factor balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge. First, while the private interest in a driver's license is substantial, the 90-day suspension is a relatively brief deprivation, and the harm is mitigated by the availability of an immediate post-suspension hearing. Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is low because the facts justifying suspension—arrest for DUI based on probable cause and the refusal to take the test—are objective, within the personal knowledge of a trained officer, and rarely subject to factual dispute. Third, the government's interest in highway safety is paramount; the summary suspension serves as a deterrent to drunk driving, provides a strong incentive to take the test (securing reliable evidence), and promptly removes potentially dangerous drivers from the roads. A pre-suspension hearing would undermine these objectives by introducing delays and incentivizing refusal as a tactic. The balance of these interests justifies the summary procedure.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. The statute violates the Due Process Clause by depriving an individual of property without a prior opportunity to be heard. The dissent argues that the core principle of due process requires a hearing before a deprivation occurs, especially when the facts—such as whether the driver was properly informed of the consequences of refusal—are in dispute and involve credibility. The majority's reliance on public safety is misplaced, as the suspension is for noncooperation with police, not for proven intoxication; a driver who takes the test and fails it keeps their license pending prosecution, undermining the 'emergency' rationale. The dissent contends that the post-suspension hearing is largely fictional, as drivers are not adequately notified of it and it cannot provide an immediate resolution of factual disputes. The state cannot justify dispensing with fundamental procedural rights for the sake of efficiency or to coerce compliance.
Analysis:
This case solidifies the application of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to administrative license suspensions, affirming the principle established in Dixon v. Love. It establishes that a state's compelling interest in public safety can outweigh an individual's property interest in their driver's license, justifying summary administrative action without a prior hearing. The decision gives states significant leeway to enact and enforce 'implied consent' laws, strengthening their ability to combat drunk driving by creating strong incentives for drivers to submit to chemical testing. The key limitation on this state power is the requirement that a prompt and effective post-deprivation hearing must be available to correct any errors.
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