MacK v. State Board of Education
36 Cal. Rptr. 677, 224 Cal. App. 2d 370, 1964 Cal. App. LEXIS 1479 (1964)
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Rule of Law:
A court may not take judicial notice of a disputed ultimate fact, such as whether a political party advocates for the violent overthrow of the government, as this is a matter that must be proven with evidence.
Facts:
- Rita Judd Mack and William Noble Mack were members of the Communist Party of the United States.
- Their membership occurred during and prior to March 1957, at which point they both terminated their membership.
- On August 15, 1958, William Mack took a loyalty oath required by the Levering Act to receive his teaching credential.
- On September 20, 1958, Rita Mack took the same oath.
- The oath required them to swear that within the preceding five years, they had not been a member of any organization that advocated the overthrow of the U.S. or California government by force or violence.
- The Macks both testified that they were attracted to communism to address social problems and did not know or believe the party advocated for the violent overthrow of the government.
- The State Board of Education sought to revoke their teaching credentials on the grounds that they had sworn falsely to the oath.
Procedural Posture:
- The State Board of Education revoked the teaching credentials of Rita and William Mack based on a hearing officer's proposed decision.
- The hearing officer found that the Macks swore falsely on their loyalty oaths, taking judicial notice that the Communist Party advocated for the violent overthrow of the government.
- The Macks filed a petition in the superior court (a state trial court) for a writ of mandate to compel the Board to restore their credentials.
- The superior court, exercising its independent judgment on the evidence, denied the petition and upheld the Board's decision.
- The Macks (petitioners-appellants) appealed the superior court's judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
May a court take judicial notice that the Communist Party advocated the overthrow of the government by force or violence during a specific period, thereby establishing the ultimate fact in dispute in a proceeding to revoke teaching credentials for falsely swearing a loyalty oath?
Opinions:
Majority - Agee, J.
No. It was an error for the lower court and administrative board to take judicial notice of the ultimate fact in dispute. A court may only take judicial notice of a fact that is a matter of common and general knowledge, well-established, authoritatively settled, and not doubtful or uncertain. The character of the Communist Party and whether it advocated for the violent overthrow of the government between 1953 and 1957 is a highly disputed matter, not an indisputable fact. Citing its precedent in Communist Party v. Peek, the court reaffirmed that if there is 'any possibility of dispute,' the fact cannot be judicially noticed and must be proven with evidence. While legislative findings on the matter can be considered as evidence, they are not conclusive and cannot substitute for formal proof of the central issue. The case was also tainted by the testimony of an expert witness whom the board itself later repudiated as unreliable, necessitating a new review of the admissible evidence by the trial court.
Analysis:
This decision significantly reinforces the limits of the doctrine of judicial notice, establishing that it cannot be used as a procedural shortcut to decide the central, disputed factual question in a case. It protects due process by requiring the government to meet its burden of proof with actual evidence, rather than relying on common belief or legislative declarations, especially in politically sensitive cases involving loyalty oaths and First Amendment rights of association. The case clarifies that while legislative findings may be judicially noticed as evidence, they are not conclusive proof and do not transform a controversial issue into an indisputable fact. This precedent ensures that adjudicative bodies must base their findings on a formal record of evidence, not on assumptions about politically unpopular groups.
