M. L. B. v. S. L. J.
519 U.S. 102, 96 Daily Journal DAR 14946, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996)
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Rule of Law:
A state may not, consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on an indigent parent's ability to pay for record preparation fees.
Facts:
- M.L.B. (mother) and S.L.J. (father) are the biological parents of two minor children.
- The couple divorced in June 1992, and the children remained in the father's custody by mutual agreement.
- S.L.J. married respondent J.P.J. (stepmother) in September 1992.
- In November 1993, S.L.J. and J.P.J. filed a lawsuit seeking to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights and to allow J.P.J. to adopt the children.
- The complaint alleged that M.L.B. had failed to maintain reasonable visitation with her children and was in arrears on child support payments.
- M.L.B. counterclaimed, seeking primary custody and alleging that S.L.J. had unreasonably denied her visitation rights.
Procedural Posture:
- S.L.J. and J.P.J. sued M.L.B. in Mississippi Chancery Court (a court of first instance) to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights.
- The Chancellor entered a decree terminating M.L.B.’s parental rights and approving the adoption.
- M.L.B. filed a timely appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi.
- After being presented with an estimated cost of $2,352.36 for record preparation, M.L.B. sought leave to appeal 'in forma pauperis' (as an indigent person).
- The Supreme Court of Mississippi denied M.L.B.'s application to appeal without prepaying costs, which effectively dismissed her appeal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted M.L.B.'s petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process or Equal Protection Clause prevent a state from conditioning an indigent parent's right to appeal a termination of parental rights on their ability to pay for record preparation fees?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes. A state is prevented by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses from conditioning an indigent parent's right to appeal a decree terminating parental rights on their ability to pay for record preparation fees. The Court's precedents, beginning with Griffin v. Illinois, established that once a state provides a right to appeal in criminal cases, it cannot bar access to that appeal for indigents who cannot afford transcripts. This principle was extended in Mayer v. Chicago to petty offenses not involving incarceration, demonstrating a 'flat prohibition' against making appellate access dependent on ability to pay. While fee requirements in most civil cases are permissible, proceedings to terminate parental rights are unique due to the fundamental, 'commanding' nature of the parent-child relationship and the 'final and irrevocable' nature of the deprivation. Such proceedings are more akin to criminal or 'quasi-criminal' matters than to typical civil disputes over money or property. Therefore, the state's interest in offsetting costs is insufficient to justify denying an indigent parent a meaningful opportunity for appellate review in a case involving the permanent and 'irretrievably destructive' dissolution of the family bond.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes. The judgment should be reversed based exclusively on the Due Process Clause. While acknowledging the majority's comprehensive review of both Due Process and Equal Protection precedents, the cases most relevant—Boddie, Lassiter, and Santosky—all rest on due process grounds. Given the fundamental interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights and the existing appellate structure in Mississippi, due process does not permit the state to erect a financial bar in the form of transcript costs that prevents an indigent petitioner from accessing that appeal.
Dissenting - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. The Chief Justice joined Justice Thomas's dissent, except for Part II, agreeing that the Griffin-Mayer line of criminal procedure cases should not be extended to invalidate Mississippi's fee requirement in this civil case.
Dissenting - Justice Thomas
No. The Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to provide a free transcript for a civil appeal of a parental rights termination. First, there is no due process violation because the Constitution does not require a right to an appeal at all; M.L.B. received a full and fair hearing at the trial level, which is all due process requires. Second, there is no equal protection violation because the fee requirement is a facially neutral rule, and the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit laws that have a disparate impact on the poor absent proof of discriminatory purpose, as established in Washington v. Davis. The Griffin line of cases rests on a flawed equalizing theory that has since been undermined. Extending that criminal law precedent to this civil case is a mistake that will open the floodgates to demands for free assistance in numerous other civil cases involving 'fundamental' interests, such as paternity, custody, and divorce.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a significant, constitutionally mandated exception to the general rule that states are not required to waive fees for indigent litigants in civil appeals. By blending the equal access principles of criminal appeals with the fundamental rights analysis of family law, the Court solidifies the unique, quasi-criminal status of parental rights termination proceedings. The ruling creates a new, albeit narrow, category of civil cases where indigents are entitled to fee waivers for appellate review, signaling that the nature of the right at stake can overcome the traditional distinction between civil and criminal access-to-justice jurisprudence. This raises questions about how courts will define the boundaries of this category in future cases involving other fundamental civil rights.
