Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association
(1988)
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Rule of Law:
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment does not prevent the government from using its own land in a manner that incidentally burdens or even destroys a group's religious practices, so long as the government's action does not coerce individuals into violating their beliefs or penalize them for their religious activity.
Facts:
- For centuries, the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indian tribes have used the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest in California for sacred religious ceremonies.
- The tribes believe that the privacy, silence, and undisturbed natural state of this 'high country' are essential for the efficacy of their rituals, which are central to their belief system.
- The United States Forest Service proposed to complete a six-mile paved segment of the Gasquet-Orleans Road (G-O road) directly through the Chimney Rock area.
- The Forest Service also adopted a management plan that would permit large-scale timber harvesting in the same sacred area.
- A study commissioned by the Forest Service itself concluded that the proposed development 'would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas' and the tribes' ability to practice their religion.
- Despite the study's findings and recommendation against the project, the Forest Service decided to proceed with constructing the road and implementing the timber harvesting plan.
Procedural Posture:
- The Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association and other respondents sued the Secretary of Agriculture in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
- The District Court found the government's proposed actions would violate the Free Exercise Clause and issued a permanent injunction against the road construction and timber harvesting.
- The U.S. Government, as appellant, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's constitutional ruling, holding that the government's interest was not compelling enough to justify the virtual destruction of the tribes' religion.
- The U.S. Government petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari on the First Amendment issue, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibit the U.S. Government from permitting timber harvesting and road construction on its own land when those activities would have a devastating and potentially destructive effect on the religious practices of Native American tribes?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice O'Connor
No. The Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the government from managing its own land in this manner. The Clause protects individuals from governmental compulsion that coerces them into violating their religious beliefs or penalizes them for their faith; it does not grant individuals a right to dictate the conduct of the government's internal affairs or its management of public property. Citing Bowen v. Roy, the Court reasoned that incidental effects of government programs that make practicing a religion more difficult, but do not coerce or penalize, do not require compelling government justification. Even if the government's actions would 'virtually destroy' the tribes' ability to practice their religion, this does not constitute a constitutional 'prohibition' under the First Amendment. To grant the tribes' request would effectively create a 'religious servitude' on public land, giving a religious group a de facto veto over public projects, a result the Constitution does not permit.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The government's actions violate the Free Exercise Clause. The majority draws a false distinction between direct coercion and actions that make religious practice impossible. The constitutional guarantee against 'prohibiting' the free exercise of religion is directed against any government action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice. By pursuing a project that will 'virtually destroy' the tribes' religion, the government is effectively prohibiting it. The dissent distinguishes Bowen v. Roy, arguing that land-use decisions have 'substantial external effects' and are not purely 'internal' government procedures like record-keeping. The majority's ruling renders Native Americans' constitutional protections meaningless against the gravest threats to their site-specific religions, sacrificing an ancient faith for a road of marginal utility.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrowed the scope of protection under the Free Exercise Clause by creating a distinction between government actions that coerce belief and those that incidentally burden religious practice. It established that government management of its own property is not subject to a compelling interest test, even if it has a catastrophic impact on a religion. This ruling effectively shifts the burden of protecting sacred sites on public lands from the judiciary to the legislature, prompting political movements that later led to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The case represents a major retreat from the balancing test applied in earlier cases like Sherbert and Yoder.
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