Lynch v. Rosenthal
396 S.W.2d 272, 1965 Mo. App. LEXIS 623 (1965)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The standard for determining contributory negligence for an individual with a known subnormal mental capacity is subjective, based on that individual's actual capacity to appreciate danger, not the objective standard of a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence.
Facts:
- Ronald G. Lynch, a 22-year-old man with the mental capacity of a 9 or 10-year-old child, lived with Fred Rosenthal and his family after being taken from a state home for retarded children at age 12.
- Lynch lived on the farm and performed chores at Rosenthal's direction in exchange for room, board, and spending money, but was not a formal employee.
- Rosenthal was fully aware of Lynch's significant mental limitations, knowing he required repeated instructions, forgot them quickly, and had difficulty with simple tasks.
- On November 24, 1962, Rosenthal directed Lynch to walk behind a moving mechanical corn picker to retrieve any ears of corn that fell on the ground.
- Rosenthal instructed Lynch to walk in the four-foot space between the picker and the wagon being pulled behind it, a location Rosenthal himself later admitted was dangerous.
- Rosenthal knew the picker's moving parts were exposed and dangerous but did not warn Lynch about the specific risks of walking in such close proximity to the machine.
- While performing the task, Lynch stumbled on the uneven ground and his right arm was caught in the picker's exposed shucking rollers, causing severe injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Ronald G. Lynch, by his next friend, sued Fred Rosenthal in a trial court to recover damages for personal injuries.
- The case proceeded to a jury trial.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Lynch, and awarded him $10,000 in damages.
- The trial court entered a judgment on the verdict.
- The defendant, Rosenthal, appealed the judgment to the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Is a person with a known subnormal mental capacity, who is injured by an obvious danger while performing a task at the direction of a landowner, contributorily negligent as a matter of law?
Opinions:
Majority - Sperry, Commissioner
No. A person with a known subnormal mental capacity is not contributorily negligent as a matter of law simply for being injured by a known danger; the question of their negligence is for the jury to decide based on that individual's subjective ability to realize and appreciate the risk. The defendant, Rosenthal, owed Lynch a duty of ordinary care because Lynch was an invitee on the property, performing a task for Rosenthal's benefit at his express direction. The court rejected Rosenthal's defense that he stood in loco parentis, as there was no evidence he intended to assume that role, demonstrated by his refusal to pay Lynch's medical bills. The central issue is Lynch's contributory negligence. Citing Cathey v. DeWeese, the court reasoned that the proper inquiry is not merely whether Lynch knew the machine was dangerous, but whether, given his documented mental deficiencies, 'reasonable minds could differ as to his realization and appreciation of the danger.' Given expert testimony establishing Lynch's mental capacity as that of a child and his inability to engage in abstract reasoning, his contributory negligence was a question of fact for the jury, not a matter of law.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the legal principle that the standard for contributory negligence is adjusted for individuals with known mental disabilities. It moves away from a rigid, objective 'reasonable person' standard and mandates a subjective inquiry into the plaintiff's actual ability to comprehend and appreciate risks. The case also clarifies that an individual performing tasks for a landowner's benefit at their direction is classified as an invitee, who is owed a duty of ordinary care, regardless of formal employment status. Furthermore, it narrows the application of the 'in loco parentis' defense in tort actions involving adults, requiring clear evidence of intent to create a parental relationship before parental immunity can be considered.
Unlock the full brief for Lynch v. Rosenthal