Lundy v. City of Calumet City
153 Ill. Dec. 874, 567 N.E.2d 1101, 209 Ill.App.3d 790 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
To establish intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must show conduct that is so extreme and outrageous as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency and which causes severe emotional distress that no reasonable person could be expected to endure, even in an employment context where the employer acts with legitimate administrative interests.
Facts:
- The City of Calumet City administered psychological tests to its police force on October 4, 1989.
- Police Chief Steven Rhoads received indeterminate and likely invalid psychological test results for Officers Steven Lundy and James Rupcich.
- Rhoads sent Lundy and Rupcich a memorandum, distributed unsealed by other police personnel, informing them their tests were indeterminate/invalid and indicating possible manipulation or mental problems.
- The memorandum relieved Lundy and Rupcich of uniformed duty, forbade them from wearing guns or badges, assigned them to the records section, prohibited overtime/secondary employment, and required retesting.
- Chief Rhoads also informed two Calumet City Council members and the mayor that Officer Lundy's test results indicated he was in a 'confused state,' 'exhibited a plea for help,' and suffered from schizophrenia or hysteria.
- Other officers who received indeterminate evaluations were not subjected to reassignment or relieved of their guns and badges.
- Lundy and Rupcich were retested one week later on November 6, 1989, and subsequently returned to regular duty.
- As a result of Rhoads' actions, Lundy and Rupcich suffered loss of sleep, chest pains, and mental and emotional distress requiring medical treatment.
Procedural Posture:
- Steven Lundy and James Rupcich filed a lawsuit against Police Chief Steven Rhoads and the City of Calumet City in the circuit court, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress.
- The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the emotional distress counts for failure to state a cause of action under section 2-615.
- The defendants also filed an alternative motion to dismiss under section 2-619, asserting immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act.
- The trial court granted the defendants' section 2-615 motion, dismissing the emotional distress counts, and struck the section 2-619 motion as premature.
- Plaintiffs Steven Lundy and James Rupcich (appellants) appealed the trial court's dismissal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a police chief's conduct of reassigning officers, relieving them of duty, and discussing their psychological test results with city officials, following indeterminate test results, constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress?
Opinions:
Majority - Presiding Justice Jiganti
No, a police chief's conduct of reassigning officers and discussing their psychological test results with city officials, following indeterminate test results, does not constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court reasoned that the alleged conduct did not, in itself, amount to actions that would cause severe emotional distress to a person of ordinary sensibilities, which requires conduct beyond mere insults or indignities. The court noted that Chief Rhoads was acting in his official capacity to address a legitimate administrative concern regarding the mental stability of officers after indeterminate psychological test results. While the delivery of the unsealed memorandum may have been insensitive, the incident was isolated, resolved expeditiously with retesting, and did not involve threats or a recurring pattern of abuse. The court emphasized that an employer-employee relationship does not automatically transform ordinary conduct into extreme and outrageous conduct, especially when the employer has a legitimate interest, as Rhoads did in this case.
Concurring - Justice Johnson
Justices Johnson concurred with the majority opinion.
Concurring - Justice McMorrow
Justices McMorrow concurred with the majority opinion.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the high bar required to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in Illinois, particularly within an employment context and involving public officials performing administrative duties. It clarifies that even seemingly insensitive or embarrassing actions by a superior, if done in pursuit of a legitimate governmental interest and not involving prolonged harassment or coercion, are unlikely to meet the "extreme and outrageous" standard. The decision highlights the importance of context, the isolated nature of the incident, and the administrative necessity of the actions in evaluating such claims, making it harder for employees to sue employers for distress stemming from workplace decisions unless the conduct is truly beyond all bounds of decency.
