Lundy v. Adamar of New Jersey, Inc.
34 F.3d 1173 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
A landowner's duty to an invitee who becomes ill is limited to providing reasonable first aid, which includes summoning professional medical assistance and rendering basic aid employees are capable of giving, but does not extend to providing advanced on-site medical equipment or specialized personnel. New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act protects a business from liability for any voluntarily rendered assistance that exceeds this limited, preexisting duty.
Facts:
- On August 3, 1989, Sidney Lundy, a 66-year-old patron with a history of coronary artery disease, suffered cardiac arrest at a blackjack table at the TropWorld Casino.
- Three other patrons, including a pulmonary specialist (Dr. Greenberg) and a critical care nurse, immediately began performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on Lundy.
- A TropWorld nurse, Margaret Slusher, arrived on the scene with an ambu-bag and oxygen.
- Dr. Greenberg asked Nurse Slusher for an intubation kit to establish a more efficient airway for Lundy.
- Nurse Slusher did not bring the intubation kit, stating it was against TropWorld policy, although the necessary equipment was stocked in the casino's medical station.
- Nurse Slusher did not retrieve the kit because she was not qualified to use it herself.
- Unbeknownst to the Lundys at the time, Nurse Slusher was not an employee of TropWorld but of an independent contractor, Dr. Dominic Carlino, who was contracted to provide medical services at the casino.
- The contract between TropWorld and Dr. Carlino required the medical station to be stocked with a laryngoscope and intubation tube.
Procedural Posture:
- Sidney and Mrs. Lundy filed a diversity action against TropWorld Casino in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.
- TropWorld filed an answer and a third-party complaint against Dr. Dominic Carlino, alleging that he was liable for contribution or indemnification.
- After the statute of limitations expired, the Lundys filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to amend their complaint to add Dr. Carlino as a direct defendant.
- A magistrate judge granted the Lundys' motion to amend.
- TropWorld and Dr. Carlino moved for summary judgment.
- The district court granted summary judgment in favor of TropWorld and reversed the magistrate judge's order allowing the Lundys to amend their complaint.
- The Lundys appealed the district court's judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a casino's duty to render aid to a patron suffering a medical emergency extend beyond summoning professional help and providing basic first aid to include having advanced medical equipment, like an intubation kit, and personnel qualified to use it on the premises?
Opinions:
Majority - Stapleton, J.
No. A casino's duty to an ill patron is limited to summoning aid and providing reasonable first aid, which does not require maintaining advanced medical equipment or personnel on-site. The court, predicting New Jersey law, reasoned that while the state would likely adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A, the duty to provide 'first aid' is narrowly construed. It requires a landowner to procure appropriate medical care and provide such interim assistance as its employees are reasonably capable of, but does not obligate the business to function as an emergency medical facility by stocking advanced equipment or employing physicians. Furthermore, any aid rendered beyond this baseline duty is voluntary. Under New Jersey's Good Samaritan Act, TropWorld is shielded from liability for Nurse Slusher's failure to retrieve the intubation kit, as this act would have gone beyond its preexisting, limited duty. The court also held that the Lundys' attempt to add Dr. Carlino as a defendant was barred by the statute of limitations because their amended complaint did not 'relate back' under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c); the Lundys' failure to name Dr. Carlino was due to a lack of knowledge, not a 'mistake concerning the identity of the proper party' as the rule requires.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Becker, J.
No, but for different reasons. The court reached the correct result only because Nurse Slusher was an employee of an independent contractor, for whom TropWorld was not liable. Had she been a direct employee of TropWorld, a jury question would exist as to whether she breached the casino's duty of care by failing to retrieve the available intubation kit for a qualified doctor who requested it during an emergency. This act would be a 'reasonable step' under the circumstances and would fall within the preexisting duty of care, making the Good Samaritan Act's protections inapplicable. The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), arguing that it was an overly technical reading that defeated the rule's purpose. Dr. Carlino should have known that, but for the Lundys' understandable mistake about the nurse's employer, he would have been sued from the beginning, and the amendment should have been allowed to relate back.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the scope of a business owner's duty to aid an invitee under the framework of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A. By narrowly defining 'first aid' as summoning help and providing only basic assistance, the decision protects businesses from the immense burden and liability of having to maintain on-site, quasi-emergency room facilities. This interpretation reinforces the line between a commercial establishment and a healthcare provider. The opinion's strict reading of the 'mistake' requirement in Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) also creates a higher bar for plaintiffs who discover new potential defendants after the statute of limitations has run, distinguishing a simple lack of knowledge from a correctable mistake of identity.
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