Luna Torres v. Lynch
194 L. Ed. 2d 737, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3351, 136 S. Ct. 1619 (2016)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A state offense qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) when it possesses all the substantive elements of a listed federal crime, even if it lacks a federal jurisdictional element like a connection to interstate or foreign commerce.
Facts:
- Jorge Luna Torres immigrated to the United States as a child and has lived there ever since as a lawful permanent resident.
- In 1999, Luna pleaded guilty in a New York court to attempted third-degree arson, in violation of New York law.
- Luna was sentenced to one day in prison and five years of probation for the arson conviction.
- Seven years later, immigration officials discovered Luna's conviction.
Procedural Posture:
- Immigration officials initiated removal proceedings against Jorge Luna Torres.
- Luna applied for cancellation of removal during the proceedings.
- The Immigration Judge determined that Luna's arson conviction was for an "aggravated felony" and held him ineligible for discretionary relief, denying his application.
- The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the Immigration Judge's decision, finding the federal and New York arson offenses identical except for the interstate commerce element.
- Luna filed a petition for review of the Board's ruling with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
- The Second Circuit denied Luna's petition for review, affirming the Board's decision.
- The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari due to a Circuit split on the issue.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a state criminal offense count as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce?
Opinions:
Majority - Kagan, J.
Yes, a state criminal offense counts as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) when it has every element of a listed federal crime except one requiring a connection to interstate or foreign commerce. The Court held that the absence of a federal jurisdictional element, such as an interstate commerce requirement, is immaterial when comparing state and federal offenses for the purpose of determining an "aggravated felony" under the INA. The Court reasoned that two contextual considerations support this reading: (1) §1101(a)(43)’s penultimate sentence, which states that an enumerated crime is an aggravated felony "whether in violation of Federal or State law and applies to such an offense in violation of the law of a foreign country," indicates Congress's intent to capture serious crimes regardless of their governmental source. Excluding state crimes merely for lacking a commerce element would undermine this purpose by creating "haphazard" and "perverse" coverage, treating equally serious state and federal crimes differently. (2) A well-established background principle in federal criminal law distinguishes between substantive and jurisdictional elements. Courts recognize that Congress uses these elements for different reasons; for example, mens rea requirements often do not apply to jurisdictional elements (United States v. Yermian). Similarly, in statutes like the Assimilative Crimes Act (Lewis v. United States) and the three-strikes law, courts ignore jurisdictional elements when comparing federal and state offenses. This settled practice demonstrates that Congress typically does not expect jurisdictional elements to be treated identically to substantive ones. The Court concluded that a standard interstate commerce element is almost always a simple jurisdictional hook and can be disregarded.
Dissenting - Sotomayor, J.
No, a state criminal offense should not count as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43) if it lacks an element present in the listed federal crime, even if that element is jurisdictional. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court’s ordinary methodology, used in prior cases like Kawashima v. Holder, requires the state offense to match every element of the listed federal crime. The plain language of "described in" implies that a description cannot refer to features the thing being described does not have; thus, if the federal statute lists an interstate commerce element, the state statute must also have it to be "described in" the federal one. The dissent contended that the INA's overlapping structure, which includes "crime of violence" provisions and other grounds for removal, already ensures that serious criminal conduct is captured, lessening the need for a broad interpretation of "aggravated felony." It also disputed the majority's "contextual considerations," arguing that the "penultimate sentence" still applies to a significant portion of the listed offenses even under Luna's reading, and that the "settled practice" of distinguishing elements cited by the majority (e.g., mens rea, Assimilative Crimes Act, three-strikes law) is not strong enough or directly applicable to justify departing from the plain text. Finally, the dissent argued that jurisdictional elements are not always trivial technicalities, as they can significantly narrow the scope of criminal conduct, citing Jones v. United States for how the interstate commerce element limits federal arson.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of "aggravated felony" under immigration law, significantly broadening the range of state convictions that can trigger harsh immigration consequences, including mandatory deportation and ineligibility for discretionary relief. It establishes a "substantive elements only" comparison for state offenses against federal ones containing jurisdictional elements. Future cases will need to define more clearly what constitutes a "jurisdictional element" versus a substantive one, particularly in marginal cases where an element may serve both functions. The ruling reinforces the principle that Congress intends a consistent application of immigration law across federal, state, and foreign convictions for serious offenses, irrespective of the federal government's specific jurisdictional hook.
