Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife

United States Supreme Court
504 U.S. 555 (1992)

ELI5:

Rule of Law:

To establish standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must demonstrate they have suffered (1) a concrete and particularized 'injury in fact' that is actual or imminent, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct, and (3) a favorable court decision is likely to redress the injury. Congress cannot statutorily confer standing upon plaintiffs who do not meet these core constitutional requirements.

Facts:

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure their actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered or threatened species.
In 1978, a joint regulation interpreted this consultation requirement to apply to U.S. federal actions taken in foreign nations.
In 1986, the Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Lujan, promulgated a new regulation limiting the consultation requirement to actions taken within the United States or on the high seas.
U.S. agencies, such as the Agency for International Development (AID), funded projects overseas, including the Mahaweli project in Sri Lanka and the Aswan High Dam rehabilitation in Egypt.
These projects threatened the habitats of endangered species, including the Asian elephant, leopard, and Nile crocodile.
Joyce Kelly, a member of Defenders of Wildlife, stated she had traveled to Egypt in 1986, observed the habitat of the Nile crocodile, and intended to do so again.
Amy Skilbred, another member, stated she had traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981, observed the habitat for Asian elephants and leopards, and intended to return in the future but had no concrete plans to do so.

Procedural Posture:

Defenders of Wildlife sued the Secretary of the Interior in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
The District Court initially granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, with Defenders of Wildlife as appellant, reversed the dismissal.
On remand, the District Court denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment on standing and granted Defenders of Wildlife's motion for summary judgment on the merits, ordering the Secretary to publish a new regulation.
The Eighth Circuit, with the Secretary as appellant, affirmed the District Court's decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

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Issue:

Do environmental organizations have standing to challenge a regulation by the Secretary of the Interior that limits the geographic scope of the Endangered Species Act, when their members allege only a general intent to someday revisit foreign project sites and cannot demonstrate that a favorable court ruling would redress the alleged harm?

Opinions:

Majority - Justice Scalia

No, the environmental organizations lack standing. To satisfy the 'injury in fact' requirement, a plaintiff must show an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' The members' affidavits, professing a mere 'some day' intention to return to the project sites without concrete plans, are insufficient to establish an imminent injury. Furthermore, the organizations failed to show redressability, as a favorable ruling against the Secretary would not necessarily bind the independent funding agencies, and there was no proof that the withdrawal of U.S. funds would stop the foreign projects. Finally, the ESA's citizen-suit provision cannot grant standing to any person who has not suffered a concrete injury, as this would violate the separation of powers by transferring the President's duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' to the judiciary.

Concurring - Justice Kennedy

No, the organizations lack standing. I agree that the respondents failed to demonstrate a concrete and personal injury sufficient for standing, as their plans to return to the sites were too vague. While Congress has the power to define new legal rights and injuries, it cannot erase the core Article III requirement that a plaintiff must suffer a concrete injury. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA fails this test because it does not identify a specific injury that 'any person' would suffer from a statutory violation, thereby impermissibly authorizing suits over generalized grievances. I would not reach the question of redressability.

Concurring - Justice Stevens

No, while I disagree with the majority's conclusion on standing, I concur in the judgment of reversal. I believe a person who has visited the habitat of an endangered species and intends to return has a sufficient injury to confer standing, and the imminence of the injury should be measured by the threat to the species, not the plaintiff's travel schedule. However, the respondents lose on the merits because the consultation requirement of the ESA was not intended by Congress to apply to federal agency actions in foreign countries.

Dissenting - Justice Blackmun

Yes, the organizations have standing. The majority applies an overly strict standard for summary judgment; a reasonable fact-finder could conclude from the members' professional backgrounds and past visits that their intent to return was genuine and the threatened harm was imminent. The injury was also redressable, as federal agencies are likely to follow a court order and the potential withdrawal of U.S. funding could influence foreign governments' actions. The Court's rejection of 'procedural injury' is a 'slash-and-burn expedition through the law of environmental standing' that improperly limits Congress's power to authorize citizens to enforce procedural safeguards designed to prevent concrete harm.

Analysis:

This decision significantly heightened the requirements for Article III standing, especially for environmental and public interest plaintiffs. By insisting on a concrete, particularized, and imminent injury, the Court made it substantially more difficult to challenge government actions with diffuse or future harms. The ruling's most significant impact comes from its separation-of-powers holding, which established that Congress cannot legislatively grant standing to citizens to sue over generalized grievances. This precedent has limited the scope and power of citizen-suit provisions in numerous federal statutes and reinforced the judiciary's role as a resolver of specific disputes rather than a general overseer of the Executive Branch.

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