Yes, but only in a specific situation. The Constitution normally protects people from the government, not from other private people. But when a private company uses a state law and gets a state official (like a sheriff) to help take property, it is 'jointly participating' with the government. So, if you sue the company by arguing the *law itself* is unfair, you have a valid case. But if you just argue the company *misused* a fair law, that's a private dispute, and you can't sue for a constitutional violation.

No. The oil company just used a normal legal tool that was available to everyone. Just because the sheriff got involved doesn't turn the company's private action into a government action. The truckstop owner should have filed a different kind of lawsuit, like 'malicious prosecution,' in state court, not a federal civil rights case.

No. The court is mixing up two different questions: was there a government action, and did the private company act like the government? The sheriff's action was the government's, but that doesn't make the oil company a government actor. Just suing someone in court doesn't make you a partner with the judge. This is an unfair ruling that punishes a regular person for following a law they thought was perfectly valid.

Yes, Edmondson acted like the government. When private people work closely with state officials to take property using state laws, it's like the government taking the property. The important points are: (1) The state law allowed the property to be taken. (2) State officials actually took the property because Edmondson asked. So Edmondson was very involved with the state in taking Lugar's property. This close involvement makes Edmondson similar enough to the government that they can be sued for violating constitutional rights, just like the government can be.

I disagree. Edmondson just used a state law that everyone has a right to use. They thought the law was valid. Just using a law isn't enough to make a private person into the government. The Court is wrong to say the state's later actions somehow make Edmondson's private actions into state actions. This unfairly expands when private people can be sued under this law.

I disagree. The Court's decision is unprecedented and unfair. Edmondson reasonably thought they were following valid state law. The Court's reasoning goes against our previous cases. It blurs the lines between state and private actions. Our cases don't say private people using state laws are acting as the state. The Court cites no cases proving private use of likely valid laws is state action. This broad ruling will unfairly entangle private people in long lawsuits just for using laws they think are okay.

First, the deprivation "must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible."

For a plaintiff to state a viable claim under section 1983 against any private defendant, the conduct of the private defendant that forms the basis of the claimed constitutional deprivation must constitute state action under color of law.

T] he conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State

The `under color of law'requirement under § 1983 is the same as the Fourteenth Amendment's `state action'requirement

—private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of property is sufficient to characterize that party as a "state actor" for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment

A "party charged with the [constitutional] deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state."

Section 1983 "provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place `under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory....'"

In order for a private party's conduct to be under color of state law, it must be "fairly attributable to the State."

—the Court held that a private individual who sought prejudgment attachment of another's property, pursuant to a state statute which allowed for attachment based on one party's ex parte application, was a state actor.

While private misuse of a state statute does not describe conduct that can be attributed to the State, the procedural scheme created by the statute obviously is the product of state action

Yes. A private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' acting under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983. The Court established a two-part test for determining if conduct is 'fairly attributable' to the State: first, the deprivation must be caused by a right or privilege created by the State, and second, the party charged must be a state actor. While misusing a valid state statute is purely private conduct, invoking the state's procedural scheme and the aid of state officials to seize property makes the private party a state actor when the constitutionality of that scheme is challenged. Therefore, Lugar stated a valid § 1983 claim by challenging the Virginia statute itself as procedurally defective (Count One), but not by alleging only a private misuse of the statute (Count Two).

No. The actions of the private respondents are not fairly attributable to the state. Respondents did no more than invoke a presumptively valid state procedure available to all creditors. Simply implicating the state and its officers by using a judicial process does not transform essentially private conduct into state action. The petitioner's proper remedy lies in private state-law tort suits, such as for malicious prosecution, not in a federal § 1983 action.

No. The Court's decision conflates two separate inquiries required by § 1983: (1) whether there was a deprivation of a constitutional right (which requires state action) and (2) whether the defendant acted 'under color of law.' While the sheriff's execution of the writ was state action, it does not follow that the private respondent who merely invoked the process became a state actor. Merely resorting to the courts does not make a party a co-conspirator with the judge. This unprecedented and unjust decision ensnares a private citizen who had every reason to believe he was acting in strict accordance with a presumptively valid law.

Yes. The Court held that private parties acting jointly with state officials in the seizure of disputed property are state actors for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment because their actions are fairly attributable to the State. This is because the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 'under color of state law' requirement of § 1983 are identical. I find that Edmondson Oil's joint participation with state officials in utilizing state procedures for prejudgment attachment constituted state action under the Fourteenth Amendment and action under color of state law for § 1983 purposes. The deprivation of property was caused by the exercise of a right or privilege created by the State and Edmondson was a joint participant with state officials in seizing Lugar's property. This is sufficient to characterize Edmondson as a state actor because the State created the procedural scheme and state officials attached the property based on Edmondson's ex parte petition.

I dissent. The claimed constitutional deprivation cannot be fairly attributed to the State. Respondents did no more than invoke a presumptively valid state prejudgment attachment procedure available to all. Relying on a dubious 'but for' analysis, the Court erroneously concludes that the State's subsequent procedural steps somehow transformed respondents' acts into actions of the State. Invoking a judicial process implicates the State but does not transform essentially private conduct into actions of the State. The Court's opinion unjustly expands the reach of § 1983 beyond anything intended by Congress.

I dissent. Today's decision is as unprecedented as it is unjust to respondent, who had every reason to believe he was acting lawfully in invoking a presumptively valid state attachment statute. The Court's analysis is inconsistent with our prior cases and undermines fundamental distinctions between state and private conduct and between 'state action' and private action 'under color of law.' Our cases do not establish that private parties who merely invoke state legal procedures act jointly with state officials to satisfy the § 1983 requirement of action under color of law. The Court cites no cases supporting that a private party's mere invocation of a presumptively valid state statute constitutes state action. The Court's expansive holding will entangle private parties in protracted constitutional litigation for innocently relying on presumptively lawful state statutes.

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.

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