Lucenti v. Laviero
176 A.3d 1, 327 Conn. 764 (2018)
Rule of Law:
To overcome the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act under the "substantial certainty" exception, an employee must demonstrate that the employer subjectively believed that an injury was substantially certain to occur as a direct consequence of their deliberate actions, rather than merely knowing of a dangerous condition or acting with negligence or recklessness.
Facts:
- Dominick Lucenti suffered various injuries on October 28, 2011, while working for Martin Laviero Contractors, Inc.
- Lucenti was operating an excavator to pull a catch basin out of the ground, and during this operation, the excavator, while running at full throttle, slipped off the catch basin and swung, injuring him.
- Before the incident, the excavator had malfunctioned and would only operate on idle speed.
- Greg Laviero, owner of Laviero Contractors, instructed a mechanic to "rig" the machine so it would only operate at full throttle, rather than properly repairing it.
- Daniel Quick, a former Laviero Contractors employee, told Greg Laviero that the rigged excavator was "too dangerous to operate" and that somebody would be injured.
- Dominick Lucenti also notified Greg Laviero that the excavator running only at full throttle was dangerous, and Laviero concurred, but stated he was unwilling to invest money in repairs because he intended to sell it.
- Greg Laviero personally operated the excavator approximately one week prior to Lucenti's injury and again after the incident.
Procedural Posture:
- On October 23, 2013, Dominick Lucenti commenced a civil action in trial court against Greg Laviero and Martin Laviero Contractors, Inc., alleging reckless conduct.
- On October 14, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing the claim was barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.
- On February 23, 2015, the trial court (Judge Shortall) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding Lucenti could not satisfy the 'substantial certainty' exception.
- Lucenti appealed the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
- The Connecticut Supreme Court granted Lucenti's petition for certification to review the applicability of the substantial certainty exception.
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Issue:
Does evidence showing that an employer was warned about a "rigged" and dangerous excavator, acknowledged the danger, and chose not to repair it, establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer subjectively believed that an employee's injuries were substantially certain to occur, thereby circumventing the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act?
Opinions:
Majority - Robinson, J.
No, the evidence presented by Dominick Lucenti does not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Greg Laviero and Martin Laviero Contractors, Inc. subjectively believed that his injuries were substantially certain to occur. The Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision can only be bypassed by proving actual intent to injure or that the employer intentionally created a dangerous condition knowing injury was substantially certain. This requires a purely subjective inquiry into the employer's belief, going beyond mere knowledge of risk, negligence, or recklessness. The court found no evidence of prior similar accidents, deliberate deceit by the employer, an extensive history of safety violations, or the affirmative disabling of safety devices. Furthermore, Greg Laviero's own operation of the excavator before and after the incident strongly suggested he did not believe injury was substantially certain, and there was no evidence of duress or coercion compelling Lucenti to use the unsafe equipment. To rule otherwise would improperly elevate routine workplace safety disagreements to tort claims, undermining the Act's purpose.
Concurring - Palmer, J.
Yes, the Appellate Court correctly affirmed the trial court's judgment because there was no issue of material fact. Justice Palmer emphasized that Greg Laviero regularly operated the excavator himself. It is 'virtually impossible to fathom' that Laviero would have operated the machine regularly if he was substantially certain that he would be seriously injured, which strongly supports the conclusion that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite subjective belief.
Dissenting - Rogers, C.J.
No, the majority incorrectly concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the employer's subjective belief. Chief Justice Rogers argued that the evidence—including Daniel Quick's explicit warning to Greg Laviero that the rigged excavator was 'too dangerous to operate' and would cause injury, coupled with Dominick Lucenti's similar warning and Laviero's agreement on the danger but refusal to repair due to plans to sell—could reasonably lead a jury to infer that Laviero knew injury was substantially certain. While Laviero's own use of the excavator is relevant, it does not compel the conclusion that he lacked subjective belief, as a jury could find his use was limited, or he was indifferent to the risk. The majority's decision places an unachievable burden on plaintiffs, effectively precluding the substantial certainty exception.
Dissenting - Eveleigh, J.
No, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants subjectively believed that the altered excavator made the plaintiff's injuries substantially certain to occur. Justice Eveleigh argued that considering the totality of the circumstances, including repeated warnings to Laviero from multiple employees, Laviero's acknowledgment of the danger, and his decision not to repair for financial reasons, a jury could reasonably infer the requisite subjective belief. The majority's reliance on Laviero's personal use of the excavator is not necessarily dispositive, as the record lacks details on the nature and extent of his use of the rigged machine for similar tasks. Furthermore, the majority's implicit requirement for evidence of coercion or duress is not part of the established legal standard for 'substantial certainty' and unduly limits the exception, making it virtually nonexistent.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies and arguably narrows the "substantial certainty" exception to workers' compensation exclusivity in Connecticut. By emphasizing the purely subjective nature of the employer's belief and adopting stringent factors (lack of prior accidents, deceit, persistent violations, disabling safety devices, and absence of coercion/duress), the court sets a very high bar for employees seeking to sue their employers directly for workplace injuries. Future cases will likely require robust evidence beyond mere warnings or acknowledgment of danger to establish an employer's subjective belief that injury was "substantially certain," making it exceedingly difficult for employees to bypass the workers' compensation system and potentially undermining the intent behind the exception.
