Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
505 U.S. 1003 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
A state regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of their land constitutes a per se compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment, unless the proscribed use was not part of the owner's title to begin with, as determined by the state's background principles of property and nuisance law.
Facts:
- In 1986, David H. Lucas purchased two vacant residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island in South Carolina, for $976,000.
- Lucas intended to build single-family homes on the lots, consistent with the development of adjacent and nearby parcels.
- At the time Lucas purchased the lots, there were no legal restrictions that would have prevented him from building single-family homes on them.
- In 1988, the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act to manage coastal development and prevent erosion.
- The Act established a coastal construction baseline, based on erosion patterns, that was landward of Lucas's property.
- The Act's provisions flatly prohibited Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his two lots.
Procedural Posture:
- David H. Lucas filed suit against the South Carolina Coastal Council in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, a state trial court.
- Lucas contended that the Beachfront Management Act's construction ban effected a taking of his property without just compensation.
- Following a bench trial, the trial court found for Lucas, concluding the regulation rendered his property valueless and constituted a taking for which he was owed $1,232,387.50.
- The South Carolina Coastal Council, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.
- The Supreme Court of South Carolina, the state's highest court, reversed the trial court's decision, holding that no compensation is due when a regulation is designed to prevent 'serious public harm.'
- Lucas, as petitioner, successfully petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a state regulation that deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial or productive use of his land constitute a taking under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that requires just compensation, regardless of the public interest advanced in support of the restraint?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
Yes. A state regulation that renders land economically valueless constitutes a taking for which just compensation must be paid. The Court identified two categories of regulatory action that are compensable without a case-specific inquiry: physical invasions of property and regulations that deny all economically beneficial or productive use of land. When a regulation deprives a landowner of all economic value, it is the functional equivalent of a physical appropriation. The state's traditional police power to regulate against 'harmful or noxious uses' without compensation does not apply as a freestanding justification in such cases. Instead, a regulation that renders property valueless can be sustained without compensation only if the prohibited land use was already restricted by 'background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.' A state cannot simply declare by legislative fiat that a use is harmful to the public interest to avoid its constitutional obligation to pay for a total taking; the limitation must inhere in the property title itself.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
No. The Court's decision is procedurally and substantively wrong. The case was not ripe for review, and the trial court's finding that the property was 'valueless' is implausible. Substantively, the state has the power to prevent uses of property it finds harmful to its citizens without paying compensation, regardless of the regulation's economic effect on the owner. The South Carolina legislature's findings that building on the coast is a serious public harm should be given deference. The Court's new 'background principles' test is no more objective than the 'harm-prevention' analysis it discards, and it unwisely restricts the ability of legislatures to respond to modern environmental threats.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
No. The Court's newly created categorical rule for total takings is arbitrary, as a landowner with 95% loss receives nothing while one with 100% loss receives full value. The exception for nuisance law is too rigid and unwisely freezes the common law, preventing legislatures from adapting to new scientific knowledge and evolving societal values. The analysis should focus on the character of the governmental action, and here, the Beachfront Management Act was a general law applicable to the entire coastline, not a measure that singled out Lucas. This generality and the important public purpose of preventing storm damage weigh against finding a compensable taking.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
Yes, the judgment to reverse and remand is correct, but the majority's test is too narrow. The proper inquiry for a total deprivation is whether the regulation is contrary to the owner's 'reasonable, investment-backed expectations.' While common law nuisance is relevant to these expectations, it is not the sole source of the state's regulatory authority. In this case, the state's action after the property had been zoned for development and most other parcels improved likely violated Lucas's reasonable expectations, throwing the entire burden of the new regulation on him.
Analysis:
This case established the 'total takings' categorical rule, a significant development in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. By creating a per se compensable taking for any regulation that denies all economically beneficial use of land, the decision sharply limited the state's police power. It shifted the analysis in such cases away from the traditional ad-hoc balancing test of Penn Central and judicial deference to legislative findings of 'harm prevention.' Instead, the Court established a new inquiry rooted in the background principles of a state's property and nuisance law, effectively strengthening the rights of property owners against extensive land-use regulations.
