Lucas v. Kriska
522 N.E.2d 736, 168 Ill. App. 3d 317, 119 Ill. Dec. 74 (1988)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
A landowner is not liable under common law negligence for injuries caused by a third party's dog on their premises unless the plaintiff proves the landowner knew or should have known of the dog's vicious propensities. The mere presence of a dog, which is presumed harmless under Illinois law, does not constitute a 'dangerous condition' for the purposes of premises liability.
Facts:
- Joan Kriska owned and operated Red Wing Farms, a stable for boarding horses.
- Kriska's sister, Edna Olson, frequently visited her boarded horse and brought her dog, a black Labrador, with her.
- Olson never leashed or restrained the dog, which roamed the stable grounds freely during her visits.
- Carolyn Wasserman, who boarded a horse at the stable, often brought her eight-year-old son, Frank Lucas, to the property.
- On March 4, 1978, while Lucas was on Kriska's property, Olson's dog approached him, jumped on him, and bit his face.
- No evidence was presented to suggest that Kriska had any prior knowledge that Olson's dog was vicious or had dangerous propensities.
Procedural Posture:
- Frank Lucas sued Joan Kriska in the circuit court of Cook County, alleging common law negligence and statutory negligence under the Animal Control Act.
- The case was tried before a jury.
- The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Lucas.
- In response to a special interrogatory, the jury found that Kriska was not the owner, keeper, or harborer of the dog, which negated liability under the Animal Control Act.
- The trial court entered judgment on the general verdict in favor of Lucas.
- Kriska, as the appellant, appealed the judgment to the Illinois Appellate Court, with Lucas as the appellee.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does a property owner have a duty under common law negligence to protect a child invitee from a dog owned by a third party on the premises, when the property owner has no knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice McMorrow
No. A property owner does not have a duty under common law negligence to protect a child from a third party's dog on the premises without knowledge of the dog's vicious propensities. Under Illinois law, a dog is presumed to be tame, docile, and harmless. For a landowner to be held liable under a premises liability theory for an injury to a child, the plaintiff must show the landowner knew of a dangerous condition on the property that children would not be expected to comprehend. Because a dog is legally presumed harmless, its mere presence is not a dangerous condition. Therefore, to impose liability on the property owner, the plaintiff must prove the owner had prior knowledge of the specific dog's viciousness, which would transform its presence into a known dangerous condition. In this case, Lucas failed to provide any evidence that Kriska knew the dog was dangerous.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the scope of landowner liability in Illinois for injuries caused by animals owned by third parties. It establishes that the traditional 'known vicious propensity' rule, typically applied to an animal's owner or keeper, also applies to a property owner in a common law negligence claim. By refusing to classify a dog's mere presence as an inherent danger to children, the court reinforces the legal presumption that dogs are harmless and places a significant evidentiary burden on plaintiffs to prove a landowner's prior knowledge of a specific animal's dangerous nature. This ruling makes it more difficult for invitees injured by a third party's animal to recover from a property owner who was not the animal's keeper.
