Lua v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
92 Daily Journal DAR 7979, 6 Cal. App. 4th 1897, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 116 (1992)
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Rule of Law:
The violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence per se only if the injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute or regulation was designed to prevent.
Facts:
- Panfilo Lua, an unemployed farm worker, was walking to a cannery in Los Angeles where he heard there was work available.
- As he approached the intersection of San Pablo Avenue and Valley Boulevard, he found his path blocked by a stationary Southern Pacific Transportation Co. train.
- The traffic crossing arms were up, and no warning lights or bells were activated.
- Lua estimated that he waited for approximately 10 to 15 minutes for the train to move.
- After waiting, Lua attempted to cross the tracks by climbing onto the train.
- As he put his foot on a coupler between two train cars, the train began to move, causing him to be injured.
Procedural Posture:
- Panfilo Lua sued Southern Pacific Transportation Co. in a California trial court.
- A jury found Southern Pacific 90% at fault and awarded damages to Lua.
- Southern Pacific, as appellant, appealed the judgment to the California Court of Appeal.
- The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial on all issues.
- The case was retried, and a second jury again found in favor of Lua.
- Southern Pacific, as appellant, appealed the second judgment to the California Court of Appeal, with Lua as appellee.
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Issue:
Does a railroad's violation of a Public Utilities Commission regulation limiting the time a train can block a public crossing constitute negligence per se when a pedestrian is injured while attempting to climb over the stopped train?
Opinions:
Majority - Epstein, J.
No. A railroad's violation of a regulation limiting the time a train may block a crossing does not constitute negligence per se for injuries sustained by a pedestrian climbing over the train. The court reasoned that for the doctrine of negligence per se to apply, the plaintiff's injury must be of the type the regulation was designed to prevent. By examining the history and stated purpose of P.U.C. General Order No. 135, the court found that the regulation was intended to prevent traffic delays and ensure public convenience, not to protect pedestrians from the potential dangers of climbing on a stationary train. Citing Prosser & Keeton and other jurisdictions, the court concluded that statutes limiting the time a train may block a crossing are generally aimed at expediting traffic, not preventing personal injuries from the train's physical presence. Therefore, the trial court committed a prejudicial error by instructing the jury that a violation of this order was negligence per se, as this likely misled the jury and formed the basis of its verdict.
Analysis:
This case reinforces a critical limitation on the doctrine of negligence per se: the requirement of a direct link between the purpose of a regulation and the type of harm suffered. It clarifies that courts must strictly interpret the intended scope of a regulation, preventing its application to fact patterns not contemplated by the enacting body. This decision limits the ability of plaintiffs to use violations of administrative, traffic-flow, or convenience-related regulations as a shortcut to establishing negligence in personal injury cases that fall outside the regulation's protective ambit. It underscores that the defendant's conduct must not only violate a rule but must also cause the specific kind of harm the rule was designed to avert.
